Forecasting Intrastate Conflicts
The end of World War II in 1945 was, and continues to be, a major line of demarcation in twentieth-century political studies for more several important categories, perhaps none so important as that of intrastate conflict. In the decades since the end of World War II, geopolitical conflict has shifted dramatically away from major interstate conflicts in favor of an alarming upward trend of intrastate conflicts – also known as “civil wars.” As noted in the study by James Fearon and David Laitin, roughly 25 interstate conflicts – wars between two nations – have been waged between 1945 and 1999 with a death toll of approximately 3.33 million. In the same period there were 127 intrastate wars – civil wars – with more than 16.2 million dead; a ratio of roughly 5:1 in both the numbers of conflicts and loss of life.[1] A related study found that the there is a considerable difference between the duration of interstate and intrastate wars, with the former lasting, on average, 480 days and the latter 1,665 days: a ratio of 3.46:1.[2] In short, civil wars have become the most deadly form of warfare on planet Earth since the end of World War II. Perhaps worse than all of these statistics is the simple fact that, with regard to the political sciences, the causes of intrastate conflict are not well understood making the potential for forecasting and preventing them very limited. This is, of course, not in any sense for a lack of trying. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, several in-depth – and, at the surface, promising – studies have emerged with the expressed purpose of attempting to root-out the major fundamental factors that contribute to intrastate conflict, build a robust model to account for those factors and, in the end, predict the likelihood of further intrastate conflict in troubled regions of the world. This essay will attempt to analyze the studies completed by the following three teams: Stanford University’s James Fearon and David Laitin, Oxford University’s Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, and Yale University’s Nicholas Sambanis with Ibrahim Elbadawi from the World Bank. While these studies constitute some of the most innovative and rigorous attempts to understand the roots of intrastate conflict, it should become quickly obvious to any reader that these attempts do not bring policy-makers substantially closer to a path of prediction and prevention than they were at the close of the twentieth century.
While each of the three teams that conducted a study on intrastate conflict has arrived at a very unique statistical model of intrastate conflicts, there are a number of factors on which they all agree. First and foremost among these conclusions, is that contrary to the conventional opinion developed in the late 1990s, the end of the Cold War did not dramatically increase the number of intrastate conflicts in the world.[3] The prevailing opinion with regard to civil wars in the late 1990s was that small, newly independent former Soviet republics with longstanding ethno-religious differences accounted for a vast explosion of intrastate wars along the periphery of Russia. In fact, Collier and Hoeffler are quick to note that out of the seventy-nine intrastate conflicts that began between 1960 and 1999, only eleven of them – an under-representative 13.92% of the total number and almost half of the average by decade - actually started after the Cold War ended.[4]
All three studies agree, though on different terms and for different reasons, that there is a statistically significant correlation between low per capita income levels (GDP), poor economic opportunity, and the presence of intrastate conflict.[5] The particulars of how per capita income factors into each model will be discussed in subsequent sections, but it should be noted that each of the studies uses GDP as a proxy for a larger characteristic of the state with relation to conflict within their own borders, with different degrees of statistical significance for their respective models. The final statistical factor that each study appears to have some level of consensus on is the effect of ethno-religious fractionalization on the prevalence of conflict: each study appears to confirm that a high degree of ethno-religious fractionalization has no significant effect on intrastate conflict.[6] One other factor that is important to the Fearon-Laitin model, the Collier-Hoeffler model and – to a lesser and indirectly related degree – the Brandt study is the amount of rugged or mountainous terrain within the state. Briefly summing up the consensus: all three of these models agree that the amount of mountainous terrain is positively linked with the opportunity for conflict or, in the Brandt study, its duration.[7] It is beyond these factors, however, that the clear agreements between each study begin to break down.
The earliest published study of the group is the Elbawadi-Sambanis group and all subsequent studies that are published on this topic appear to be, at some level, a response to it. Published in 2002, this study set out to highlight what they perceived to be a major flaw in overstating the economic impact on civil war prevalence at the expense of studying ethno-religious fractionalization.[8] The study operates on three fundamental hypotheses: a. An increase in economic opportunity within a state will decrease the prevalence of civil war, b. An increase in democratic polity ratings within a state will decrease the prevalence of civil war and, c. The closer that ethnic fragmentation approaches a middle amount, the higher the increase of civil war prevalence will manifest.[9] The first two hypotheses are not particularly unique in political thought, but the third hypothesis does provide a potentially new insight into the forecast. According to the Elbawadi-Sambanis model, a highly fragmented degree of ethnic diversity – as one might find in the United States – and an extremely low degree of ethnic diversity – as one might find, ostensibly, in Uzbekistan or Mongolia – both provide a very low risk of civil war. It appears as though the closer the ethnic diversity ratio between two groups within a state approaches 50% apiece, the higher the risk of civil war manifests, especially in conjunction with a high national population. While the significance of ethnic fragmentation seems to be the heaviest statistical factor weighed by this study, it is not the only factor discussed. In analyzing the polity rating for states with previous civil war data, the study suggests that a low democratic polity rating also implies that the population of the state has a significant lack of options whereby they may peacefully articulate grievances.[10] This political reality, according to the study, is tantamount to inevitable military conflict. It is from this logic-inspired deduction that Elbawadi and Sambanis arrive at the pre-eminence of democratic regimes in preventing political conflict, admittedly in spite of this particular factor having been dismissed by a number of previous – and subsequent - studies.[11] In the end, however, the model affirms that no particular variable should be treated as independently significant, as economic variables may be tied to ethnic fragmentation, highly democratic polity ratings may be the result a powerful economy and all of these factors may be determined by historical intrastate conflict.[12] The subsequent recommendation of the study to policy-makers is threefold: a. it is important to improve the number and quality of democratic regimes in the world, b. it is important to improve the economic opportunity and growth of impoverished nations, by way of increasing a nation’s per capita income, and c. that improving the political conditions for a state is more feasible than attempting to develop advanced and high-yield economic infrastructure in a repressive regime with a low polity ranking.[13] This is the most troubling aspect of their conclusion. The essence of their policy recommendation is that, despite any statistical correlations between a high polity ranking and lack of intrastate conflict, policy-makers should engage in what amounts to the age-old practice of “nation building” in order to decrease the overall risk of civil war. One would be remiss not to mention its apparent ideological link with that of the actions taken by the Bush administration in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The two primary efforts to increase economic and democratic values within troubled regions of the world – Afghanistan and Iraq – are still ongoing and, currently, without any substantial exit strategy.
Continuing in the chronological order by which these studies were published, we arrive at the study conducted by Fearon and Laitin, published in February of 2003. Fearon and Laitin intended to produce a model that tracks the conditions favoring the development of an insurgency within a nation. This approach, according to the study in response to the Elbawadi-Sambanis model, are more effective than those models that focus too directly on ethno-nationalist fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and government regime type.[14] This study, claiming to have considered proxies for ethnic fragmentation and regime type and finding them statistically insignificant, concluded ultimately that per capita income trumps both of those factors.[15] In short, regardless of ethno-religious diversity or antagonism within a state, the higher the per-capita income, the less risk there is within that state for insurgency. It seems that, in the view of Fearon and Laitin, the old colloquial adage that you can simply rub the money “wherever it hurts” holds true. Moreover, Fearon and Laitin are not particularly convinced that those factions that identify themselves as “ethnic” or “nationalist” have any substantial difference from any other form of insurgency.[16] It would be misleading, however, to classify Fearon and Laitin’s views of ethnic diversity as wholly insignificant as they do argue that ethnic diversity can indirectly lead to conditions which provide prime ground for insurgency, even if they don’t influence the insurgency directly.[17] This position on regime type and ethnic fragmentation, then, is a noteworthy shift away from the belief that grievances are the main motivations for intrastate conflict, rather than opportunity. Their model for insurgency is based almost entirely on the premise that wherever there are opportunities for (i.e. a sufficient number of factors favoring) insurgency, regardless of the motivation, an insurgency will emerge to challenge the government. These factors include, but are not limited to: a newly independent state, a politically unstable central government, a substantial national population, a separate territorial base from the central seat of government (such as East Pakistan/Bangladesh), the willingness of foreign governments or diasporas to provide funding and/or weapons to insurgents, the presence of low-weight, high-value natural resources for exploitative use by insurgents to fund activity, and/or the presence of oil.[18] It should be noted, however, that the dismissal of grievances as a significant or driving factor behind civil war are predicated on both a logical and statistical hypothesis that even the most homogenous national populations have differing factions with grievances against the group in power. Perhaps the most statistically significant factor in the Fearon-Laitin model has to do with the strength of central government, proxied by the state’s per capita income.[19] The foundational premise for using per capita income as a proxy for government strength comes is based on the notion that the lower a nation’s GDP is, the less money there is for the government to tax/appropriate for public services, police and infrastructure. Tellingly, the Fearlon-Laitin model shows that a decrease of $1,000 in GDP can result in an increase of 41% in the chance for civil war. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin argue that weakened economic conditions (including low per capita income) make recruiting easier for insurgent factions.[20] Nearing the conclusion of their study, Fearon and Laitin suggest that these states with low economic production should be classified as their own kind of regime type (regardless of polity rankings) known as “anocracies”, a government whose central authority is either weak or non-existent. These anocracies, because of a lack of government revenue by way of economic production, do not have the resources – outside of foreign aid – to stamp out the insurgency.[21] The only obvious exception to this hypothesis are those states with extensive oil reserves providing the central government with sufficient “easy” money without the need to develop a strong social infrastructure, leaving dispersed populations, in theory, isolated enough to develop an insurgency without the watchful eye of the government.[22] The conclusion and recommendation of the Fearon-Laitin study is: in order to decrease the statistical likelihood of civil war within a country, the central governments in high-risk scenarios must be strengthened, well funded and aided in the development of a socially “intrusive” bureaucracy.[23]
The final and newest of the three studies being analyzed is a model developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler from Oxford University in 2004. Collier and Hoeffler attempt to offer an “econometric” model of predicting civil war, relying on a blend of “motive and opportunity” believing that rebellion, like murder, requires both.[24] Noting that political scientists have long argued that grievances are the reason for civil war, not opportunity or “greed”, the Collier-Hoeffler model attempts to combine the most statistically significant factors of both schools of thought. In the same vein that launched the Fearon-Laitin study, Collier and Hoeffler argue that all countries have factions that have “exaggerated grievances” against the governing power and, therefore, a grievance-only model will not be robust enough to predict intrastate conflict.[25] The model relies on an analysis of over ten “opportunity” factors and four “grievance” factors. While many of the opportunity factors listed are eventually whittled down to measure their statistical significance within a combined model, the final factors that remain in the model are: economic dependence on a primary commodity export, funding for the insurgency provided by foreign diasporas and/or foreign governments, per capita income, male secondary schooling, economic growth rate, and population demographics.[26] The most statistically significant factor of the group is, by far, state dependence on primary commodity exports. According to the published study by Collier and Hoeffler, the “risk of conflict peaks when [primary commodity exports] constitute 33% of GDP”, thus, “primary exports are highly significant.” At “peak danger” of 33% of GDP there is a 22% of civil war, compared to 1% for countries with no primary commodity dependence.[27] The four grievances listed – ethnic or religious “hatred”, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality – do not seem to provide much staying power to the model as the two most analyzed grievances are quickly dismissed. Ethnic dominance is discarded because “peace episodes” and “war episodes” have the same amount of dominance and economic inequality is only “slightly higher” [emphasis added] prior to conflict episodes than peace episodes.[28] In the end, Collier and Hoeffler appear to end their recommendation on a peace keeping note, urging policy-makers to help maintain peace in those countries that have seen intrastate conflict, since – as they interpret the final factor – by way of a cliché: “time heals.” In other words, the longer the duration since the last intrastate conflict the more chance a state has to recuperate and reinforce those positive forces that discourage civil conflict.[29]
What is most obvious from an analysis of these studies is that no group is any closer to developing a robust understanding of how civil wars start or, by the same token, how to prevent them. The only certainty that avails policy makers and forecasting experts alike is that the loss of life, infrastructure and opportunity will continue for the foreseeable future. Moreover, as a later study suggests, it is not even clear that developing a model on “statistically significant factors” can produce the kind of predictive power that aids in the overall efforts to reduce conflict.[30] These statistically significant models are unable, according to some accusations, to predict – in any substantial sense – out-of-sample examples and leave more questions in some areas than answers. For instance, would the current violence perpetrated by drug cartels with the Mexican and United States government agencies be considered an insurgency or civil war by any of the models? Native Americans, living on federal land grants and receiving federal aid money, have not petitioned for more autonomy or taken up arms against the surrounding states or agents of the US federal government. Neither have they been subject to internal civil wars despite being poverty stricken, low male secondary schooling and poor economic development opportunities. How would Collier and Hoeffler explain this out-of-sample situation? Can efforts, though not yet violent, in Hawaii for secession from the United States – based on ethno-linguistic grievances with the Federal government and a lower per capita income for local residents – be considered or analyzed under any of the models? Can gang related violence and drug-trafficking in highly populated urban areas of the US be classified as “insurgency” by the Fearon-Laitin model? In the end, perhaps the most important questions remaining are: do the quasi-arbitrary distinctions of national borders stand as the ultimate parameters for studying civil unrest and conflict, and must groups have stated political goals in order to contribute to intrastate conflicts?
[1] Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75-90. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “FL” in footnotes.)
[2] Brandt, Patrick T., T. D. Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicholai Petrovsky, and Dagmar Radin. "When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars." Defence and Peace Economics 19.6 (2008): 415-34. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “Brandt” in footnotes.)
[3] Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and grievance in civil war." Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563-95. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “CH” in footnotes.) FL page 75 and CH page 581.
[4] CH page 569, calculated by dividing the 11 intrastate wars of the 1990s by the total 79 wars over 39 years where each decade should have seen, on average, 20 intrastate wars.
[5] Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. "How Much War Will we see?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 307-34. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “ES” in footnotes.) FL page 76, CH page 588, ES page 311
[30] Ward, Michael D., Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin Bakke. "The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Prediciting Civil Conflicts." Proc. of 50th Annual Convention of Interational Studies Association, New York. 2009. Print. (Henceforth referred to as WGB in footnotes.)
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