Showing posts with label Friedrich Nietzsche. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Friedrich Nietzsche. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 07, 2009

Pity, Revenge and Eternal Recurrence


Pity, Revenge and Eternal Recurrence:
An Analysis of Thus Spoke Zarathustra

            Late nineteenth-century Germany gave birth to one of the most provocative and incendiary thinkers in European history, Friedrich W. Nietzsche. Widely considered by modern scholars to be one of the most influential philosophers and writers of the last two hundred years, Nietzsche spent the prime of his life attempting to place common European values, rooted in what he viewed as a Platonic-Christian tradition, under erasure. His deeply critical views on Christianity and Platonism have earned him a – perhaps unfounded and inaccurate – reputation as a notorious atheist and anarchist, but a careful analysis of his writings uncovers a much different image. Nietzsche’s better-known philosophical texts like Ecce Homo, The Gay Science and The Will to Power, written in a polemic style, often absorb much of the spotlight in Nietzsche studies at the expense of Nietzsche’s only fictive work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but do so with a terrible detriment to understanding Nietzsche’s philosophy. In this fictional masterpiece, Nietzsche weaves an intricate quasi-fictitious narrative revolving around the character Zarathustra – based on, Zoroaster, the Persian religious figure traditionally dating from the sixth century BCE – and his journey from being the teacher of the Superman to the teacher of Eternal Recurrence. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche employs various figures and characters with both metaphorical and allegorical relationships to dominant personalities within the Western historical tradition, while Zarathustra’s interactions with these characters behave as a platform for Nietzsche to communicate his challenging ideas in a subtler and less confrontational medium than his other aphoristic writings. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is, arguably, a book about the idea of Eternal Recurrence and its potential to replace, albeit nihilistically, the Platonic-Christian traditions as the system by which all Western values are generated. Moreover, it would not be an inappropriate interpretation to say that Nietzsche argues in the novel that the philosophy of Eternal Recurrence provides a more natural and powerful concept of redemption and justice than those traditionally attributed to Jesus and Plato, respectively. Embracing values that depart from the reactionary motivations of pity and revenge, this philosophy of Eternal Recurrence attempts to seek out an actively creative relationship to nature, replacing the old values system with “new, half-written” ones.
            In the first chapter of Zarathustra, Nietzsche elaborates on what he refers to as the three metamorphoses of man: the camel, the lion and the child. The three metamorphoses bear a seemingly analogous relationship to the three stages of nihilism – living under a set of values, actively destroying those existing values, creating new values – and even in this early stage of the novel it is possible to see a foreshadowing of the cyclical nature of Eternal Recurrence in the narrative, which will be explained later. Having its roots in his longstanding contempt for metaphysical ontology, Nietzsche explains the camel as representative of man as a beast of burden. Within this interpretation, men – like the camel – have become docile and subservient, allowing themselves to be saddled down with the foreign weight of a values system based in a “wrong-headed” belief that there is an eternal, metaphysical and absolute “afterworld” that dictates an equally eternal and absolute morality, codified with a rigid understanding of good and evil.[1] In the world of Zarathustra, the man-as-camel is laden down with the weight of the “old law tables”.[2] Where the Christian apologist may be tempted to dismiss Nietzsche’s criticism as part of a largely failed tradition of atheistic critique against Judeo-Christian metaphysics, he/she would be grossly underestimating the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s own interpretation. To Nietzsche, speaking through Zarathustra, the burdensome metaphysical value system provided by Jesus and Plato stands as a life-negating force that, in its core, seeks answers outside of life itself, looking to an afterlife for worth rather than the one we all ostensibly share here on Earth. “It was suffering and impotence that – created all afterworlds… But that ‘other world’, that inhuman, dehumanized world which is a heavenly Nothing is well hidden from men” and it is these sickly men that “have a raging hate for the enlightened man and the youngest of all virtues which is called honesty.”[3] The great sin of metaphysical philosophy, and belief in God, is not simply that it hinders man’s growth but rather that it devalues and undermines human life altogether. For Nietzsche, metaphysical convention is a product of human weakness, a coping mechanism that provides a meaning and purpose for human suffering where there is none. This “Spirit of Gravity” – as it is referred to in Zarathustra – is what creates the man-as-camel along with words and values like “compulsion, dogma, need and consequence and purpose and will and good and evil”, which help cultivate a reactionary spirit within man and rob him of his actively creating will.[4] It appears to be, within this interpretation of the novel, that the highest value of both Platonism and Christianity is selflessness and a love of others over the love of one’s self. Unfortunately for those invested in the current convention, as Zarathustra tells his listeners and followers, valuing others over one’s own self is a prison and a negation of life: it is the root of pity and its indulgence is the origin of revenge and resentment.[5] Moreover, this reactionary value, to pity your fellow man – indeed, even worse to let your pity move you to help him – does not ultimately serve the needs of your neighbor. In an ironic interpretation of human pity and compassion, Nietzsche claims that aiding the afflicted very often reinforces a belief that people require an outside force to act upon them in order to “help” them. Worse, it may lead the healed or helped into a discontent with the way physis “created” them, while also obliging them to the healer and creating a bondage to them which, over time, may create a resentment and a desire for revenge.[6] Just as Nietzsche associates a reactionary pity with the idea of Christian healing and redemption, it is this reactionary revenge that Nietzsche clearly sees as the foundation for Platonic justice.
            “Your killing, you judges, should be a mercy and not a revenge. And since you kill, see to it that you yourselves justify life”, says Zarathustra of the “Pale Criminal.”[7] All throughout Zarathustra Nietzsche writes passionately on the need for man to reconceptualize “justice,” to take it from the realm of “good and evil” and reaction and into a realm of active creation and attuning our minds to physis via a naked and impartial observation of nature. In physis, one can hear him claim, there is no morality, no good and no evil. A distant star, half-the-galaxy away explodes and destroys whole planets. Where is physis’s remorse? Where is her shame in all of that destruction? There is none and this is Nietzsche’s “truth”: death and destruction are a part of life and the beauty of that reality stems from the idea there is no revenge inherent to physis, no cosmic score to settle. Physis does not react, it acts and as such the destruction that is perpetrated within it is necessary and even good. One might even understand this scientifically with the idea that the distribution of matter and energy associated with the death of a star is the birthing grounds for new matter to form, new energy to take shape, new life to begin. From those distant supernovas, to violent Earth-bound hurricanes, to the slow decomposition of a single insect: this is the cooperative – albeit violent, dangerous and deadly – dance that physis is performing every moment of existence. It is the dance that she beckons all life to participate in with her. Indeed, it is her justice: perhaps the only real justice in the world. But Zarathustra, as well as Nietzsche, observes another system – an artificial system – being imposed on man and nature. This artificial convention relies on arbitrary ideas of good and evil and the virtues of our values system is based on rewards and punishments… reaction rather than pro-action, and it has become part of our foundation.[8] Justice, within this understanding, has become all reaction: “revenge, punishment, reward, retribution.”[9] This idea we call justice in the Platonic-Christian tradition is a “cold” justice with “cold steel” (or revenge), but Eternal Recurrence requires a justice that not only “bears all punishment but also all guilt” and devises a justice that acquits everyone but those that sit in judgment.[10] In other words, Eternal Recurrence requires that the “old tables” of morality and reaction be smashed and replaced with “new, half-written” ones. To Nietzsche, what we call goodness and justice, including virtue and moderation, is nothing more than weakness, cowardice and mediocrity.[11] Books One and Two of Zarathustra are used as the platform by which Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate how men hide behind their lofty metaphysics and those associated virtues in order to shield them from the impartial “reality” of life. He does not, however, simply limit his criticism to the idea of justice in the abstract but also extrapolates that criticism onto the modern state and, in particular, the modern, liberal and democratic state. In Zarathustra, the state is called “universal slow suicide” and he claims that it is produced by the same good-evil convention that produced Christian redemption and Platonic justice.[12] In a sense, one might convincingly argue that Nietzsche envisioned the state as the offspring of the parental pairing of Christianity and Platonism. Worse, however, than simply giving life to the state is the peculiar way in which the Christian-Platonic tradition had encouraged the development of the democratic ideology and the powerful framework of “equality” that supports it. In the section titled “Of the Tarantulas” Nietzsche, crying out vicariously through the biting voice of Zarathustra, asserts that it was the revenge of the slaves that gave birth to Christianity – a religion of slaves as Nietzsche referred to it – which, in turn, forced the powerful rulers of the Earth to adopt democracy in order to lower the great into a false equality with the “rabble.”[13] This Christian-Platonic tradition, complete with its imported metaphysical good and evil, its moral codes, its pitiful redemption and vengeful justice, its Church and its State is, to Nietzsche, the first metamorphosis: the heavy laden man-as-camel, driven relentlessly into the desert… into isolation and a life negating environment. And, as Zarathustra explains to us, it is here in this desert that the second metamorphosis happens: the camel meets the lion and is destroyed by it.[14] It would not be inappropriate for the “lion” to be interpreted as a sort of “active nihilism” as Nietzsche would call it. This man-as-lion is described as full of courage and able to destroy those values and “law tables” which burden men and divert his affections to odious “afterworlds” and, as such, may represent an element within man that is able to free himself from the convention to which he is bound. Zarathustra explains, however, that the courage and will to destroy the camel is not enough to create new values. This responsibility lies with the third metamorphosis of the “child” and its actively creative will, its “unlearned” mind – a mind not yet conditioned to the falsities of the Christian-Platonic tradition – and its voiceless and carefree appreciation of the moment and affirmation of life in all forms.
            Many conclusions can and may be drawn on what the ultimate meaning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra was intended to be, assuming, of course, that Nietzsche had any hard-and-fast meanings attached to the novel. There can be no doubt that he was a brilliant rhetorician and, as such, it might honor Nietzsche most to conclude that Zarathustra has an infinite number of meanings and, at the same time, a resounding lack of “meaning” as we’ve come to know it. After all, this novel is a “book for all and none.” With all of that being said, however, it would not be inappropriate to surmise that this book is, at its core, a book about Eternal Recurrence. That “heaviest weight” of this idea foreshadows every page of the text, giving clues and glimpses in the fog of Zarathustra’s journey. It waits patiently, voicelessly in the darkness and stillness of Zarathustra’s own mind and soul to be revealed… that ineffable truth which can barely be spoken, let alone categorized, canonized and formed into a doctrine. Eternal Recurrence, Zarathustra’s “mistress” and “abysmal thought,” requires the heart of the third metamorphosis, the man-as-child, in order to come forth.[15] Indeed, Nietzsche seems to argue that the “abyss” of Eternal Recurrence can lead to your demise or kill you outright; trying to comprehend it can drive you mad and trying to live it may undo you altogether.[16] Perhaps one of the most maddening aspects of Eternal Recurrence is that it is so unexplainable. As Nietzsche reminds us, “truth” and “reality” cannot be spoken. Language itself is a convention – perhaps even the progenitor of all convention – bringing a woefully inadequate medium to the task of comprehension, by virtue of language’s own inherent limitations as well as man’s own limited powers of perception on the Universal scale.[17] Among the few interpretations that one might be able to offer with regard to Eternal Recurrence is one that might claim that the moment, Das Augenblick, is in fact a microcosm of Eternal Recurrence. In this interpretation, the concept is offered that the “past” and the “future” are not progressively linear (i.e. Past à Moment à Future) but, rather, that the Augenblick is, as Zarathustra claims, the “gateway” by which all past and all future coalesce into the ever-present “now” (i.e. Past à Moment ß Future).[18] In a sense, then, man is not a goal or a destination but instead, as Zarathustra claims, a bridge or a tightrope suspended over the abyss of Eternal Recurrence, balancing himself in the moment, affirming the moment, dedicated to every moment of life on Earth without reservation.[19] This, however, raises the quintessential question of human life: why, then, are we here? Where is the purpose? Perhaps more pointedly: why should we abandon, indeed destroy, the old Christian-Platonic convention (a values system that provides a compelling – even flattering – identity and purpose for humanity) for this new one? Men, Nietzsche seems to claim, need to create their own values, their own good and evil, their own “law” for themselves. The “good” and the “just” as we know them today make no room for those with their own values, they are – and always have been – set against such people. And who better to invoke as an example of this than Jesus? It was the “good” and the “just” Pharisees that killed Jesus, and, thus, his premature death seems to have perpetuated a values system that negates life.[20] Indeed, the very life of Jesus himself can be interpreted not as the life of a camel but as a lion! His teachings and ministry is marked, albeit incompletely if you were to ask Nietzsche, by a powerful – epoch splitting – “trans-valuation” of the values that supported the world in which he lived. Yet, as Zarathustra would remind his followers in Book Two, Christians don’t appear to be very “redeemed” at all and, as such, they would have to seem to be much more “redeemed” if they were to inspire any great belief in the power of their Redeemer. Men, according to Nietzsche, would do better to find redemption elsewhere, a redemption that is of their own creation and not beholden to a Redeemer, not a reaction to the pity taken on them by a God.[21] Furthermore, one could argue that Nietzsche intends to say that it is the will to create that is the true redemption for man. The metaphysical redemption of Jesus and metaphysical justice of Plato do not seem to be compatible with one another. One might even make a persuasive argument that they are mutually exclusive to one another since it seems that the former moves the metaphysical “Power” to pity and the latter to revenge and punishment, a potentially irreconcilable situation.[22] The creative will, however, is “truly” redemptive because it has evidently unlearned reactionary motivation and defines its relationship with physis actively, engaging it, participating with it, affirming it in its totality. Creation and procreation, then, may be seen as the true act of redemption. A redemption that is not found in humility or in the selfless bloodletting that is, arguably, life negating, but is rather found in creation.[23] Alongside this more naturally attuned redemption is, not surprisingly, a more naturally attuned justice: a justice that restores inequality to men because men, by the virtue of their inherent differences are, not only different, but also unequal. Within this interpretation it is physis itself that requires inequality and the domination of the great over the least. Nature exposes for us the path of strife and contention with one another and this process is called “beautiful” and “natural.”[24] Also, within this interpretation, is a more natural “purpose” for humanity if it is appropriate to call it that. The “purpose” of men and women is war and childbirth: the balancing of contention and creation and it is within the juxtaposition of these activities – which are proactive and not reactive – that the anthropos element within physis finds the “balance” of the moment.[25]
            It would seem to be a very poor reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra if one, by the end, was unable to discern Nietzsche’s distaste for Platonic justice and Christian redemption, along with all of the cultural, moral, political, and religious offspring that they produced. Indeed, that point alone seems to be hardly worth raising. What is not immediately clear is how Nietzsche intended to usurp those two pillars of Western civilization. The philosophy of Eternal Recurrence behaves as an unspoken thread that runs through the course of Zarathustra, uniting it thematically – yet “voicelessly” – in a powerfully nihilistic and “trans-valuating” work of fiction. It might be said that this “book for all and one” stands in human intellectual history as a unique demonstration of the “truth” that the values that move the world are, indeed, ineffable.


[1] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 211
[2] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 214
[3] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 59-61
[4] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 211, 215
[5] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 87, 113, 255
[6] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 159
[7] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 65
[8] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 117
[9] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 118
[10] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 94
[11] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 189-190
[12] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 76-77
[13] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 123-125
[14] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 177
[15] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 168-169, 178
[16] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 178-179
[17] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 234, 247
[18] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 179
[19] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 44, 104
[20] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 89-90, 98
[21] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 116-117
[22] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 161-162
[23] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 111
[24] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 124-125, 149
[25] Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 91, 227


The Mad Oracle and the Death of God


The Mad Oracle and the Death of God

In his book, The Gay Science, Nietszche presents a comprehensive synthesis of his assault on convention and those values that feed on it. Book Three of The Gay Science contains some of Nietzsche’s most provocative statements in regard to truth, knowledge, logic, religion and morality. In aphorism 125, Nietzsche presents a parable titled “the madman.”[1] In this parable a “madman” rushes into a marketplace crowded with people, many of whom we are told, are atheists. This madman, armed only with a loud voice and a lantern, claims to be seeking God and asks where he can be found. Hearing only jeers in response from the crowd of atheists, he proceeds with a rant about the death of God complete with apocalyptic imagery of the end of the world. After providing this knowledge to the crowd the Madman sees that they do not yet know of this event and surmises that he has come too early and leaves. This parable of the madman acts as a vehicle for Nietzsche to provide images and ideas that help translate some of his more abstract philosophies regarding nihilism, eternal recurrence and the will to power. This essay will attempt to interpret the various possible meanings to this parable and find correlations with other Nietzschean writings, particularly his essay on “How the ‘Real World’ Finally Became a Fable.”

With the introduction of the “madman” in his parable, Nietzsche immediately establishes that this individual a different sort of person than the others in his environment. The mere fact that Nietzsche refers to him as “the madman” sets up his peculiarity and this perception is directly underscored by his eccentric wielding of an ostensibly superfluous lamp “in the bright morning hours.” Nietzsche also feels compelled to draw a distinction between the Madman and the men of the marketplace via his irregular clamoring on the subject of God. These men of the marketplace – we are told – are atheists and mock the Madman, both because of his strange light-casting accessory as well as his outlandish quest to “seek God.” This Madman, despite his later claim that “God is dead,” does not appear to be an atheist like these men around him. He is something different. The atheists, while not believing in God, continue to behave as though they exist in a world that God dominates. Plainly stated: their denial of God acts also as an affirmation of God. Their belief in a non-God is still a belief in God since it behaves as a sacro-ideological framework with a negative central foundation. In other words, the sacred belief of the atheist is that there is no sacred. The Madman’s astonishing claim that “God is dead” does not appear to be reflective of atheism in the sense that Nietzsche would understand it, and neither does it appear to be a statement of divine mortality. Cast in the tradition of apocalyptic literature, this parable introduces various allegorical images and – like any good writing of this genre – provides the keys for decoding itself in the surrounding text. The Madman introduces the idea of God as “the Sun”: the central foundation of sacro-ideology in the Western philosophical tradition. The Madman equates, rather directly, the death of God with the loss of the Sun. In this respect, Nietzsche is claiming – through his mad oracle – that the central empowering convention of Western civilization, that convention which enables all other values and conventions in Western civilization to exist and thrive, has lost its hold and is decomposing. With this apparent paradigm shift, Nietzsche is communicating to his readers that the idea of God is not something to believe in – with affirmative or negative belief – but rather to be regarded with indifference and ultimate insignificance. In this sense the Madman claims that God is dead: his convention-affirming powers have been put to an end. Furthermore, because God has died, the Madman has also pronounced the impending death of the conventional world. This is why he brings a lantern with him into the marketplace: he expects that there should be no light in the world but what he brings with him.
            It is, perhaps, most revealing that Nietzsche’s parable exists in a world where the Sun is still actually shining. The atheists did not know that God has been killed, neither by the virtue of the event itself or the effects it would undoubtedly have on the conventional world. They ridiculed the Madman in the beginning and, upon hearing his declarations, were silent and astonished. These images seem to be suggesting a number of possible meanings. Nietzsche might be admitting, when he says, “Gods, too, decompose” that while God may have already died, his being was not immediately extinguished but, like a physical body, is in the process of decomposing: his power diminishing littlebylittle over time. This image is consistent with Nietzsche saying that the Sun has been “unchained” rather than saying that it has been destroyed or “died.” The power that the idea of God has, a power to feed and sustain the conventional world, appears to be gradually receding over time. We’re not told how long it has been since “the event” of God’s death, but it would be logical to assume that it has not been very long since no one seems to have noticed a change in the natural lighting. The Madman makes one peculiar statement about the consequences of killing God when he refers to the loss of the Sun. He says that we unchained “this earth from its sun.”[2] What is interesting about this statement is the fact that he does not use an absolute article like “the” when describing his parable’s world and its Sun. Rather, Nietzsche is subtly reminding us with his rhetoric that the world as we know it is only one possibility of many possibilities, able to change and adapt itself to our will and wishes.[3]Not only is there the possibility of a world without the nomothetic convention of “God” but it is also, in Nietzsche’s understanding of our own world, a current reality. As with parabolic world of the Madman, this world must cease to be one that we are familiar or comfortable with inside of our expectations and needs insofar as they are reliant or founded on convention. It would be a world where the sea was drunk up, where the horizon was wiped up with a sponge. A world where the sun does not shine, indeed where there is no sun at all, a world that “plunges continually,” that strays in empty space through an “infinite nothing.” Moreover, the conscious use of “this” instead of “the” in the passage also suggests another important Nietzschean concept: there is no “the world,” that is to say there is no “true world.” 
In light of this reality that the Madman enlightens his contemporaries to, he also asks, rhetorically, where this leaves the world. What path does it take from here now that it has no center of gravity, no foundation? It is here that the Madman acts, in a sense, as an oracle predicting the future of the world. His questions appear rhetorical, as though are more prognostication than interrogation. The Madman hints that the world will take a path of active nihilism as it moves “away from all suns.” In other words, he claims that all values will wither and die as the world hides itself from all foundational centers of convention. Nietzsche envisions a world where there is no moral center for these values as this active nihilism removes an absolute point of reference: “is there still any up or down?” But the specific use of the directions “up” and “down” cannot be ignored in their metaphysically connotations either: most famously in that of “heaven” and “hell.” Finally, the Madman also questions his own utility in this reality when he asks, perhaps not as rhetorically as the other inquiries may be, whether or not it is necessary “to light lanterns in the morning” as he has done. What is the Madman’s conclusion in response to this question? “I have come too early… my time is not yet.” He claims to be ahead of his time, out of place in a time when the “sun” still shines. While it is not entirely clear that Nietzsche is identifying himself, via allegory or supposition, as the Madman of this parable though it would not be an entirely illogical conclusion, and the alleged foresight of the Madman is very similar to Nietzsche’s own exposition of self-importance in “Why I Am a Destiny.”[4] Nietzsche calls this parabolic oracle a “madman” but it becomes apparent in the course of the aphorism that he only appears to be mad because he exists in a different reality than those in the marketplace and, presumably, the rest of the conventional world. He is a man of the future or, perhaps more accurately, an “alien” in the strictest definition of the word. By referring to this man as “mad” Nietzsche may be paying him a backhanded compliment while highlighting the peculiarity of this man in comparison to his contemporaries in the parable.
            This parable, while unique in its vehicle of delivery, shares substantial commonality with many of Nietzsche’s other aphoristic writings, including “Why I Am a Destiny,” The Will to Power and “How the ‘Real World’ Finally Became a Fable: History of an error.” While Nietzsche’s “history” of the idea of the “real world,” as presented in “How the ‘Real World Finally Became a Fable,” is categorical, concise and notably devoid of prose, one could easily draw a parallel from this aphorism – especially stages five and six – with the parable of the madman.[5] Stage five appears to describe a return to the neo-Heraclitean dismissal of being as “an empty fiction” as applied to the “real world.”[6] This “real world,” as Nietzsche explains it in earlier stages, is predicated on the assumption of the metaphysical and this assumption – beginning with Plato and passing through various phases of European Christianity – terminates in stage five of Nietzsche’s history. This stage is represented via the morning of the marketplace in the parable. The stage, like the morning, is the beginning of nihilism: the refutation of the “convention” of God and the values that feed upon it. “The real world – we have done away with it: what world was left? [The] apparent one, perhaps?... But no! [With] the real world we have also done away with the apparent one![7] This is, in effect, the claim of the Madman. While it seems that Nietzsche’s parable is a world of stage five, his oracle has transcended even this stage into the final stage: the stage of complete nihilism. The values have been negated along with the foundational convention. The “real world” is decomposing along with God. The chain tying this earth to its sun has become undone. The “real world” and the “apparent one” are no longer. This Dionysian physis, now freed from its nomothetic limitations, is hurtling through the dark, empty and infinite expanse of space, away from all convention.
            There are, of course, problems with this idea as presented by Nietzsche. The most notable problem is that Nietzsche is unable to give any idea of what this “stage-six world” looks like. After all of the values have been “transvalued,” after all convention has been removed, after this world-as-we-know-it is dead… what is left? Nietzsche tells us in The Will to Power that mankind, through nihilism, is not returning to a state he once had. Nihilism is not the path to paradise lost. Eden is not the destination for which the nihilist strives. The nihilist understands that he “cannot reach the sphere in which we have placed our values” and, thus, “we deny end goals: if existence had one it would have to have been reached.”[8] This is, to Nietzsche, the nature of “eternal recurrence” – an essential component in life-as-physis: the conventionless Dionysian existence.[9] Yet Nietzsche cannot explain what this “Life” looks like without convention. How should it operate? How would we know when we arrived there? Indeed, can we even arrive there if there are, in fact, no “end goals”? These are questions that Nietzsche does not adequately resolve in his parable or in his related writings. It should not, however, be said that this is entirely his fault. To vividly comprehend this Dionysian world he speaks of would require an unprecedented transcendence of thought and a reformulation of communication: linguistic and conceptual. The human mind seems to be, in its perceptive abilities, limited to those ideas and images that have an anchor in the observable. The communicative limitations of human imagination would seem to be the last hurdle in between Apollonian nomos and Dionysian physis.


[1] Ansell-Pearson, Keith, and Duncan Large, eds. The Nietzsche Reader. Grand Rapids: Blackwell Limited, 2005; p.224 (aphorism 125)
[2] Emphasis added
[3] Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. New York: Vintage Books, 1968; pp. 326-327 (aphorisms 600, 604)
[4] The Nietzsche Reader, p.514
[5] The Nietzsche Reader, p. 464-465
[6] The Nietzsche Reader, p. 462
[7] The Nietzsche Reader, p. 224
[8] The Will to Power, p. 11, 36
[9] The Will to Power, p. 550