Tuesday, December 08, 2009

The American Reformation


The American Reformation:
A Historiography of the Social History of Early American Christianity


            While reading the book Myth of a Christian Nation, by Gregory A. Boyd, I came across a passage where Dr. Boyd recounted a familiar scene in my own past experience: sitting in church during a service dedicated to Independence Day where an old rugged cross made of wood sat in the back corner of the stage with an American flag wrapped around it while the projector played video clips of fighter jets flying over the Capitol in Washington and the congregation sang the Star-Spangled Banner and the Battle Hymn of the Republic. In my youth I thought nothing of the images, the sounds or the general spectacle of this kind in a church service. After reading Myth, however, I began to realize how peculiar and – in a way – how distinctly American this blending of patriotism, democracy and Christianity were. Many of the American Christians I’ve had the opportunity to know personally – whether conservative, moderate or liberal – believe that American political and social values are uniquely suited to host vibrant communities of evangelical Christianity and celebrate a marriage of American exceptionalism and Christian millenarianism. The courtship of this relationship in the early republic period of American history has come under renewed study and recent scholarship has attempted to fill in the gaps left my previous historians. Early modern contemporaries and modern historians alike have found themselves challenged in trying to understand not only one of the most significant political revolutions during this period but, arguably, one of the most important socio-religious transformations in Western history as well. While the greater body of research done on early American Christianity has been centered on the theology and biographies of prominent Puritans and evangelical ministers, recent scholarship on the subject has begun trending toward an understanding of this transformation in the context of social history.[1] In this sense, the democratic and populist changes that swept across America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are no different than other similarly researched events. As with most historical research, there is no significant consensus among the scholars on many ideas expressed in each of the studies I have researched for this essay. From ideas about socio-economic conditions to clerical abuse, political power struggles, and a developing hunger among contemporaries for a new kind of ethics, it is possible to come away from each text with more questions than answers. Having completed similar research on a related social movement, the European Protestant Reformation, it has become clear that many of the research techniques, scholarly approaches and even conclusions overlap significantly between the two periods. Just as European social historians very clearly claim that the religious nature of the Protestant Reformation contained significant political connotations, American historians surveyed in this essay suggest that the political revolution in the late eighteenth century accompanied, if not altogether responded to, a budding religious revolution in North America. It is within this transatlantic historical perspective that I refer to the changing religious landscape of the early republic as an “American Reformation”. It is understandable that some may object to my reference of this period of religious history as an “American Reformation” but – as I hope to show early in this essay – the reference is not only justified, but fitting. Moreover, this essay will attempt to trace the topical evolution of the American Reformation as a “social history” in order to understand the questions it has raised, the fresh viewpoints it has unveiled, and the significant contributions it has made to our understanding this groundbreaking movement.
            As mentioned previously, there are several shared themes, techniques and conclusions between the social historiography of the European Protestant Reformation and the American Reformation. The foremost and – hopefully – most obvious between these two historiographies is the attempt by social historians to place significant developments in religious history into a broader social, economic and political context. Social history surrounding the Protestant Reformation in Europe began in the mid 1960s by, mostly, German historians during a very troubled time in modern German history. As any historian might remember, Germany was divided into two separate nations – one communist, one democratic – and the clash of ideologies bled over into every facet of life, including historical research. Produced as a post-modern descendent of Marxist economic-historical critique, the new social history attempted to place new interpretations on previously settled historical questions like the German Reformation. Firstly, I would like to show that the social historians of the American Reformation not only shared similarities in technique and findings with their European counterparts, but also that there is a solid chronological continuity from the European studies to the analogous American ones. Whereas the bulk of European Protestant Reformation scholarship was published between 1979 and 1988, most of the current scholarship on the American Reformation was done between 1985 and 1994. There are, of course, a few outlying exceptions for both research fields on both sides of the timeframe, but, again, the large majority of published works fall into those timeframes. Researchers like Max Weber, Steven Ozment, Hans Hillerbrand, Peter Blickle and Lee Palmer Wandel – among others – took up the history of the common man’s Reformation with particular enthusiasm, exploring questions of increased involvement of local layman on the eve of the Reformation, the German Peasant War of 1525, Christian millennialism, iconoclasm, clerical antagonism, the notion of sola scriptura, local election of church pastors in conjunction with increased laity control over church administration and access to the Bible in vernacular German. As will hopefully become evident through the course of this essay, American and European social historians shared as much in common as the two religious cultures they studied.[2]
            Turning now to the research on the relationship between American Christianity and American democracy it seems appropriate to begin with Alexis de Tocqueville. Certainly, it feels suitable to begin with Tocqueville by the simple fact that he was among the first scholars to write extensively about the relationship between American Christianity and American democracy, or that he is quoted ubiquitously on the subject by twentieth-century historians, but it is also fitting that should begin a comparison of Protestant religious phenomena on two continents with the observations of a Catholic that had a foot in both. While it is true that Tocqueville was not an American, a Protestant or a “common” man, he does provide an important window into understanding this relationship during the early republic period. In the book Tocqueville’s Civil Religion, Sanford Kessler attempts to bring Tocqueville’s astute observations and claims about American “civil religion” into a context of the contemporary social history. Kessler’s understanding of Tocqueville, constructed from an analysis of the book Democracy in America, begins from the starting point that religion was the first of America’s political institutions. Claiming that Protestantism – from the very beginning with Luther – required a very real and present reliance on private judgment, Tocqueville draws an invisible, but direct, line from the events in America to the events in Reformation Europe. Not only is this reliance on private judgment a hallmark of Protestant confessions, it is – as he reminds us – a requirement democratic polity. Moreover, Tocqueville’s unique attunement to the contemporary cultural phenomena of democratic populism led him to claim, well ahead of his time, that religious authority had shifted dramatically after Jefferson’s election to become vested in public opinion for most Americans. This new democratic atmosphere not only fostered the Enlightenment and sectarianism, but also allowed religion to function as a practical apparatus for common people to access political franchise and even political power.
This is not to say, however, that Tocqueville believed that these changes did not come without considerable risk. Indeed, the principles of democratic equality, if implemented in daily life, had such a decentralizing and individualizing potential that he feared it might bring down traditional Christian institutions. As some modern historians would later argue, Tocqueville could not have been more correct. These dangers were born out of evangelical religious leaders and itinerant preachers – most of whom placed such a central emphasis on eternal salvation and eternal damnation – making the acceptance of Christianity dependent on self-interested motivations. Kessler, in his appraisal of Tocqueville’s study, finds few faults in this visionary observer, but primary among them is his most serious failure to anticipate or acknowledge the importance of American evangelicalism, which goes almost completely unmentioned in Democracy in America.[3] These conclusions and observations of Tocqueville on the effects of individualization and democratic values on American Christianity are similar, in many respects, to those that were made in European Reformation studies about the affirmation of the laity and the relationship between the Reformation and the German Peasant War of 1525 as a means to access power through the close-knit religious communities made by Gunther Vogel, Heiko Oberman and Peter Blickle. Where the German Peasants had failed in their revolt against oppressive ecclesiastical and feudal lords, the Americans succeeded and – in doing so – secured even more control over their local religious and political communities than the Reformation-era Germans were able to.
One topic that few other historians even attempted to seriously address in their research was the concept of evangelical millennialism. I found that the relatively surprising gap in this field of research was sufficiently and pleasantly filled with Ruth Bloch’s 1985 book, Visionary Republic. Millennialism, according to Bloch, returned with vigor to the forefront of Christian communities after the Protestant Reformation – especially among the more radical denominations – and, in response to magisterial persecution, these communities were forced to migrate to America bringing the millennialist expectation with them. For the English colonists, she claims that millennialism started mostly in the English Civil War in 1640 by the Whigs, and Radical Whig ideology came, in part, from some of the more radical elements of the Reformation. While the Puritans were especially attuned to this concept, Bloch believes that the French and Indian War on the eve of the American Revolution helped advance the belief that the end was near as it was the worst in a series of wars between England and France, Europe’s two largest and strongest powers. Moreover, the French and Indian War saw an uncommonly high increase in the employment of terms such as “liberty” and “tyranny” especially when drawing a distinction between English civil liberty and French monarchy, or Protestant and Catholic values. The American millennial vision was almost wholly centered on the American belief that these colonies had a special role to place in bringing about the end of days and the coming of the Lord, and soon after the French and Indian War charges of “Romish” behavior – which was synonymous in eighteenth century English society with antichristian – in the Church of England were also levied as veiled attacks against the English political institutions. The American Revolution, then, was not simply a political revolution, according to Bloch, but also may have been understood as Christians participating in a movement that would bring them one step closer to the coming of the Kingdom of God. After establishing that American colonists were abundant in comfort with Great Britain being paralleled with the Beast of Revelation, she outlines a very meticulous path among American evangelicals in the earliest years of the republic of disillusionment with the centralization of American government. This disillusionment translated, in Bloch’s research, to a direct religious change of Christianity’s enemy from the British Empire to moral and social reform at home. In other words, with the enemy from without subdued, American Christians turned their attention to the myriad of enemies within near the turn of the nineteenth century.[4] While Bloch’s survey of American millennialism stops, rather abruptly, around 1800, what she does provide is fascinating and enlightening. What she does appear to lack, however, is the permutation of American millennialism that inevitably came in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Her more than fifty pages of endnotes demonstrate both the extensive and diverse research she conducted for this book, much of which are primary sources ranging from sermons to hymns and even early modern prophetic pamphlets. Bloch’s work not only does much of the heavy lifting in drawing a thematic line between European religious phenomena and the American Revolution, but also sets up a perfectly acceptable foundation for understanding the kind of political, social and religious expectation that set the evangelical revolution in motion in the nineteenth century.
In his 1987 book, Faith of Our Fathers, Edwin Gaustad attempted to build, in some respects, upon those initial observations about the institutionalized nature of religion in America by analyzing not only the state of American religious sentiments in the early republic but also the doctrinal confrontations between evangelicals and the Founding Fathers. Gaustad argues that in the decades leading up to the Revolution, evangelicals began a socially intrusive campaign against ecclesiastical authority. This campaign, he claims, stemmed from the popular opinion among Americans that civil and religious authorities were co-conspirators in the effort to keep men in servility, thus the liberty of one necessitated the liberty of the other. This attack on religious authority did not happen in a vacuum, however. The Church of England went wherever England went, and to attack the legitimacy of the Church of England was to attack the legitimacy of England in whole. In the same way that the Reformation movement was a rebellion against papal and Catholic ecclesiastical abuses, so too was the rise of evangelical reform movements a rebellion – of sorts – against England in Gaustad’s opinion. After the success of the Federalist agenda in 1789, churchgoers in America found it more appropriate to become closely involved in both the administration both of their local church as well as government policy. The explosion of evangelicalism is in some respects, according to Gaustad, a response to Federalist success in government of keeping power both centrally located and in fewer hands than many Americans were comfortable with. It should be no surprise – in the way that Gaustad frames his message – that the explosion of evangelical religion in America coincided with the Jeffersonian presidencies. In simple terms, evangelicalism was most certainly an exercise in popular authority by lay churchmen. Gaustad’s conclusions are drawn, if not too heavily, on the overwhelming statistical data that illustrates just how quickly the Methodists and Baptists replace the Congregationalists and Episcopalians as the churches with the most members. Indeed, in just seventy years Methodism grew to be over 500,000 members and outnumbered Congregationalism, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Lutheranism combined. Like many of his contemporaries, he finds solid footing on the inter-related nature of the cultural transformation as he claims that the “age of volunteerism turned into an age of reform – an American revolution all over again, only this time not in politics but religion.”[5] In the epilogue of his book, Gaustad initiates what will become a recurrent theme in the study of Western Christianity, by claiming that religion, like politics, found itself torn between establishing liberty and equality via individualization and governing via community. Where Gaustad might earn some criticism is that his endnotes cite, so lopsidedly, secondary resources from the mid-to-late twentieth century in contrast to some contemporary works that do far more analysis of primary documents. This is not to suggest, however, that Gaustad did not perform an appropriate amount of research but the question of how much of his conclusions and arguments rely on other historians remains. I also found it curious that his analysis of the social dimensions of American evangelicalism were located in the beginning and the end, but the middle sections of his book – where one might find evidence of extensive and exhaustive research in the primary sources – were only biographic profiles of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Madison and Adams. These chapters were not entirely unrelated to the central thesis of this book, but the unusual format certainly made it harder to follow the thread of thought from start to finish. In all, however, I think Gaustad’s argument that challenges to ecclesiastical authority in the eighteenth century paved the way for American challenges to English political authority are valid and deserving of further investigation.
The suggestion that evangelicals were the “principal subculture” and among the principal shapers of the larger American social, religious and political culture is the topic that occupies Richard Carwadine’s 1993 book, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America. Focusing his research primarily on the larger denominations of the nineteenth century, he claims that there was considerable pressure from within the rank-and-file membership for ministers and organizations to throw their collective weight behind moral legislation during this period. Whatever prior objections Christianity had about getting into bed with politicians and governments had to be laid to rest quickly as, Carwadine claims, to abstain from political involvement would have been to swim against the current of mainstream American expectations, religious or otherwise. Providing an uncompromising tone to American politics, the visionary and idealistic evangelical Christian communities exercised a more active role in influencing the direction that American society took, after complaining from the political sidelines about corrupt electioneering by the party-driven system that flourished after Jefferson. The most important contribution that this hefty work of scholarship provides to the field is an explanation of the evolving relationship between evangelical denominations, especially Baptists and Methodists, and political parties, such as the Whigs, to deliberately and effectively influence the legislative process in America. Moreover, what is particularly significant about this relationship is that it was driven by pressure from within those denominations and it represents a radical change in status for the Methodists and Baptists who, until then, had been denominations that represented those on the disenfranchised margins of American society.[6] The similarities in the evolution of church-state relations between the Methodists and Baptists in America and the Lutherans and Calvinists in Europe are striking and, as with several other topics, are prime targets for further review.
Approaching the topic of early American evangelicalism from the rare perspective of gender studies, Susan Juster’s Disorderly Women strikes a delightfully balanced note between respecting the evangelical movement on its own terms while incorporating important questions about how masculine and feminine relationships influenced the dominant religious and political values of the time. While the gender perspective is both important to historical studies in general and to this topic in particular, I am particularly interested in the arguments that she raises with regard to the relationship between American religious communities and the political development of American democracy. This selective treatment of the text should not be interpreted as a lack of respect for the body of Juster’s research, rather it simply reflects the focus of this essay’s historiographical question. As Juster, herself, claims that this book is more about political discourse and the boundaries of power than simply gender in Christianity, I feel that my interpretation of the text for these purposes is within bounds. Juster’s overriding theme in Disorderly Women is that evangelicalism was a “particularly powerful way” to construct the relationship between self and community and, in light of that, New Light Puritanism can be understood as movement that facilitated a “relative egalitarianism” with regard to church government in colonial America. Perhaps more directly to the point, Juster claims that early American history can be understood as an “evolution of political ideology away from the consensual model of republican virtue to the mechanical mode of democratic self-interest”. It is precisely this theme of transference from republicanism to democratic ideologies. The Great Awakening overturned the hierarchy and structure of sacred space, while social arrangements and social orders were abandoned at revival camp meetings. Not only would you find the poor, the marginalized and the sinners, but you would also find the itinerant preacher providing access to the power of God. Drawing from a concept that the “feminine” element of society does not simply include women – but also the marginalized – her claims at evangelical egalitarianism begin to take sharp focus. These camp meetings had both religious and political significance in that the Puritan community was made up of highly ordered people and space, and the evangelical community was one of language: something everyone had equal access to and – at least theoretically – equal control over. It was this quasi-egalitarian “golden age” that was sacrificed during the Revolution as the cultural tide in America shifted to a hyper-masculine sense of independence, making a revolution for property rights and right of self-rule for proto-Victorian values against Britain more important than the retention of Christian communal equality. Turning to the question of the American Revolution, Juster claims that was radical in that evangelicals – especially Baptists – wanted to see the apparatus of church and state disappear, but less radical in that they sacrificed many of their “called out” values at the alter of political revolution. In the midst of the American Revolution, Evangelicals began to transfer their position from “outside” temporal and spatial arrangements of power to engage them from within and, in doing so, secured a powerful position in that alliance. Post-Revolutionary America, to Juster, represented the completion of a shift in values from the egalitarian qualities of primitive evangelicalism – an expression best seen in the Anabaptist communities of southeastern Germany – to a renewed affirmation of cultural masculinity. In the end, she we are asked to revisit the age-old question of “what does it profit a man to gain the whole world but lose his soul?” as she argues that evangelicals sacrificed too many of the egalitarian principles that made them attractive to the “feminized” element of American society in order to become mainstream and acceptable within the new masculine-dominated social order.[7] Disorderly Women is a particularly well-researched book and the number of Puritan and Baptist church records books she pored over in order to write this book is overwhelmingly impressive. Her interpretation of masculinity and femininity in the negotiation of social power provides an altogether rare vision of American power politics and the role that evangelicals played in creating, then abandoning, a true vision of inclusion for all.
While there are many good questions yet to be raised over what the “spiritual center” of Christianity in America is, there are few scholarly discussions that take place on this question without Mark Noll’s extensive research coming to the table. His many books and papers on the topic of American Christianity are considered to be among the highest and most exhaustive secondary sources in modern historical research. One of the earliest papers Noll wrote on the subject of American Christianity was, titled “The Image of the United States as a Biblical Nation, 1776-1865”, wherein approaches the centrality of the Bible as a text of private as well as political significance in the early republic. To Noll, the Bible was not only used in private for personal “nourishment”, but ministers used it to explain and encourage the American vision that saw exceptionalistic potential and destiny. From the most unlikely success of the Revolution, ministers were able to claim that America had a divinely providential place in God’s plan to redeem the world and establish the Kingdom. In this way, the Bible was both a source of truth, the source of a narrative that could be replicated to produce prosperity and power. In a later paper, titled “Revolution and the Rise of Evangelical Social Influence in North Atlantic Societies”, Noll explores what he sees as a consistent relationship between evangelical revivalism and political revolution in North Atlantic countries. Market revolution was a very close ally to evangelicalism at “every state in its North Atlantic history”, Noll claims and suggests that Evangelical preachers “exploited” revolutionary environments in various regions. The success of evangelical revolution in America – among other regions – was due to the success of political revolutions. Noll claims that successful economic and political revolutions have the effect of destroying traditions. In the midst of disarray, the individualization of evangelical religion found it much easier to spread than under the more traditional – if not more repressive – social conditions. It does not take much to see how these observations are related to those arguments – made especially by Peter Blickle – that the German Reformation was a hand-in-hand collaborator of the German Peasant Revolt of 1525. It is in his 576-page tome, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, that Noll shows his most exhaustive research. In this book, he claims that there was – and some say there still is – a symbiotic relationship between American socio-political identity and American religious identity. Tracing the beginning of the major social changes to the population booms following the American Revolution, he claims that churches in America had to meet the needs of a growing and diverse communities, produce enough trained ministers to meet the demands of that growth, and expand their influence to the “hinterlands” of the colonies in response to the migration and expansion. The subsequent revivals that contributed to the Great Awakening saw the Gospel preached more to the socially outcast element of America more than any other time in history.  Instead of insisting that sinners come to church, the revival mentality saw that church came to the sinner. He also claims that the Great Awakening was America’s first truly “national” event: it facilitated an identification of individuals as Americans and fostered a growing distrust of European hierarchical order. The fear of centralized political tyranny after the French and Indian War led many Americans to affirm that the human being was responsible for his own conscience and this translated to religious beliefs as well, thus leading to the evangelical revolution. Noll attunes his argument about the values-smashing nature of revolutions in general to the American Revolution in particular and claims that it stimulated social changes of every kind, including the “new tide of democracy” that influenced the old denominations and created new ones. The result of these changes was that by the midpoint of the nineteenth century evangelicals were no longer the “outsiders” of American religion but, rather, occupied the greatest and highest positions of social and political recognition. This is not to say, however, that there were not still “outsiders” to reach – or exploit – as he turns, albeit briefly, to the question of Mormonism and Joseph Smith. Smith’s religion, Noll claims, drew upon culturally surging themes of democracy – the right of one to choose and think for himself – and republicanism – the distrust of power to corral a new congregation of followers for an entirely new dispensation: a topic that is brilliantly researched by the next author, John Brooke.[8]
In his book, The Refiner’s Fire: The Making of a Mormon Cosmology, 1644-1844, Brooke immediately introduces the reader to one of the most powerful differences between Mormonism – now referred to as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints – and the rest of the Christian denominations that were created and flourished in the early nineteenth century: Mormonism was not a new denomination, but an entirely new dispensation – equal to the ones given to Moses and Jesus. Brooke, while on shaky ground according to some criticism he has received in response to this book, is insistent that the cultural “preparation” among the disenfranchised members of American society was linked, albeit via a rather ambiguous and confusing route, to the Radical Reformation movements of Europe. Similarly to Bloch’s arguments about the transmutation of expectant millennialism from the Radical Reformation communities to American evangelical groups, Brooke also claims that Mormon cosmology was influenced heavily by restorationist millennialism and occultism. Occult practices, Brooke claims, accompanied the migration patterns of communities that came over from Europe after magistrates started cracking down on Radical Reformation sects, though he does little to substantiate that claim. Where his argument does find stronger footing is in the area of social franchise. Mormonism gave radical Christians a place to belong and captured a popular need to restore authoritative polity to Christian religion in a very decentralized and fragmented faith, while not being strictly hierarchical. In this way, Brooke claims that the founding families of the Mormon faith were all “particularly prepared” because of the outsider and dejected social conditions they came from. Not only did Mormonism give outsiders ground-level access to a new community that promised both social and cosmically metaphysical power, but Smith also relied on the economic anxieties of these families. In the new faith debt was emphatically placed as a supreme enemy, but Smith also placed a premium on alchemical and counterfeiting practices that – according to Brooke – many of these families would have already been familiar with. Alchemy was important for these radical Christian sects, Mormonism included, because it was a vehicle of wealth for poor families and communities. The ability to change common materials to precious metals or stones was, as Brooke alludes to, the ultimate “get-rich-quick” scheme of the day. Moreover, the creation of a new money economy in America saw an unprecedented growth in counterfeiting, from coins to bills or – in Smith’s case – religious documents. These documents were worth more than money to those that needed to hear what was contained within and it was the content of those documents, rather than the dubious nature of their creation, that were valuable to the early Mormon families. In this way, Brooke argues that a “ church of miracles attracted a particular kind of convert”, with the implication being that those converts were either naïve, desperate or both. Whatever the case, Brooke’s book – despite some of the criticisms it received – does quite a bit not only to trace a line via similar cultural conditions between radical, post-Reformation American Christianity and radical, post-Reformation European Christianity, but he draws an intentionally direct one as well, linking the two research fields together as well.[9]
With his two books, The Sacred Cause of Liberty and The Democratization of American Christianity, Nathan Hatch has shown why his is one of America’s leading scholars on the topic of the American Reformation. Tracing the symbiotic revolution of evangelicalism and populist democracy in America from the late eighteenth century to the mid nineteenth century, Hatch has provided the kind of research and analysis that only a very few American historians of this period have ever reached. A fellow professor of history at Notre Dame with Mark Noll, Hatch’s work matches a similar quality and, in the process, has earned several prestigious awards in American history. In his earlier work, The Sacred Cause of Liberty, Hatch outlines how republican liberty came to be known as a cardinal Christian belief – thus necessitating a strong reliance on individual conscience – and how between 1740-1780 the clergy were asked to be ever-increasingly involved in the formation of a prosperous and republican nation. Among other topics, this book’s central area of focus is on American ministerial involvement in the Revolution via the vision of “God’s elect” against the “antichrist” of oppression and tyranny. Hatch claims that the civil millennialism of the Revolution grew directly from politicizing the millennialist expectations and experiences of New Englanders for the prior 20 years and that American ministers were convinced that they were to play a special role in the providence of the coming of the millennium. Hatch also claims that the “vision of history” in Revolutionary New England was that the success or failure of liberty was the single thread of events that connected the European Protestant Reformation to the Revolution. Once the Revolution was over and independence from Britain had been secured, the quest for virtue – the lack of which in history showed to be the death of the ancient republics – was the preeminent quest of American clerical and political patriotism, according to Hatch. The republic’s future was understood to be tied to the amount of its direct investment in American Christianity, both in public education an the promotion of public worship and which assisted in a developing belief, for many Christians, that “cosmic forces” were arrayed against liberty to continue seeking religious and civil oppression. Moreover, a sense of romantic patriotism provided ministers and churches with the solidarity of Christian unity that they required in a time of intense denominational splitting. It is the occasion of this intense fragmentation of American Christianity that occupies Hatch’s The Democratization of American Christianity, wherein he argues that democratization is the key to understanding American Christianity and suggests that an increasing value of populism changed both the political and social landscape. Claiming that the Revolution changed the dynamic of American society in all forms, he goes on to argue that people could take charge of their own lives not only in politics, but in their religious associations as well. In this wildly changing climate of religious associations, American Christianity suffered from a form of “withering” institutional establishments, as American congregants wanted their churches to come down to their level. Moreover, Hatch’s claims are pinned on the suggestion that the establishment of major print in America made all of these changes possible and this change shifted the power to produce information away from the elites of American society to commoners. What immediately becomes obvious, with Hatch’s expert help, from analyzing the papers produced by this print revolution is that there was a deep-seated animosity against the educated and highly-trained professionals in American society and that this anticlericalism was part of a larger movement of class struggle. Traditional institutions were portrayed as incompetent, there were ubiquitous comparisons of the educated clergy to an aristocracy or canonical tyrants and a general equation of “elite” professionals with the antichrist. The religious free-market principles that Hatch sees in the early nineteenth century lowered the quality of religious rigor as the population of America – then as now – favored the majority of individuals with little or no education over the elite few that received extensive educational training. Sermons of this time became very similar in nature to campaign speeches, with elements of demagoguery and party-style membership recruiting, where populism in religion borrowed from revolutionary ideas of dissent as well as fear of consolidated and “back-room” power. Hatch claims that there was a complete lack of uniform recognition in religious circles and that this coupled nicely with a cultural development that helped democracy and nationalism became the uniform idea that everyone could jump on board with. This is not to say, however, that there was a declension of religious zeal in favor for the political sphere, but rather that Hatch sees transference of popular assent from traditional institutions to the enthusiastic revival. This period, according to Hatch and many others, is characterized by an unprecedented buffet menu of Christian churches from which the average citizen could choose, and since the common man had a tendency to identify with itinerant and unschooled preachers, the solidification of evangelical populism became complete. Hatch’s work helps bring the question of the American Reformation back to a practical question of, “how did this period shape the landscape of American religion today?” He suggests that democratization has led to a complete, downward trend in the kind of men that American religion and statecraft produces reminding today’s Americans of the woeful fact that post-democratic America has not produced the kind of theologian as Jonathan Edwards or the kinds of statesmen as our Founding Fathers. The term “winning souls” has become an indicator of a capitalistic numbers game of quantity over quality in both American churches and American politics and, barring another epoch-splitting catalyst, it is unlikely to ever do so again.[10]
It is a common axiom among historians that a topic will receive as many unique interpretations as there are scholars researching it. The American Reformation, while able to be loosely grouped into a finite number of mildly contending groups, is no exception. Perhaps one of the strongest qualities of modern historical research is the diversity of viewpoints offered among scholars. There should be no doubt that the studies of social historians on topics of both European and American religious phenomena have irrevocably impacted the modern historical discipline and, by my estimation, for the better. What we may now see more clearly through the efforts of both historical fields is that each respective religious Reformation served not only to reinvigorate religious affections among groups of people that may have otherwise seen declension, but that they served another – perhaps even greater – purpose of providing those outlying members of society access to political, economic and social power that had been so long to them denied. Perhaps more importantly, with regard to the history itself, this socialization of historical research provided both the inspiration and the means for scholars to research the most underrepresented demographic in history: the everyday person. From comprehensive social studies, like A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada, to gender-related research projects, like Disorderly Women, social history of the American evangelical revolution has cast an increasingly bright light into the shadows of our common past. Understanding such an important turning point in American history is crucial for understanding the world we currently live in. It is difficult to resist, in history, the dangerous temptation of an easy explanation and the potential overzealousness to draw direct causalities, especially on a subject so profoundly important as democratization. The rich heterodoxy of the American Reformation research provides generous material for not only understanding the nature of the movement itself, but also insights into the culture that produces the historiography.


[1] Harry Stout, “George Whitefield in Three Countries,” in Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies in Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles and Beyond, 1740-1990, ed. Mark A. Noll, David W. Bebbington and George A. Rawlyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 68.
[2] See attached bibliography for list of published works cited in German Reformation social history
[3] Sanford Kessler, Tocqueville’s Civil Religion: American Christianity and the Prospects for Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 2, 17, 50, 86, 93, 95, 98, 169.
[4] Ruth Bloch, Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3, 4, 13, 37, 43, 47, 58, 68, 87, 107, 110.
[5] Edwin Gaustad, Faith of Our Fathers: Religion and the New Nation (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 13, 21, 110, 122, 123, 136.
[6] Richard Carwadine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), ix, xv, xix, 9, 17, 34, 61.
[7] Susan Juster, Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), vii, 3, 4, 10, 11, 22, 24, 33, 108, 113, 144.
[8] Mark Noll, “Revolution and the Rise of Evangelical Social Influence in North Atlantic Societies” in Evangelicalism: Comparative Studies in Popular Protestantism in North America, the British Isles and Beyond, 1740-1990, ed. Mark A. Noll, David W. Bebbington and George A. Rawlyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 113-30.
Mark Noll, “The Image of the United States as a Biblical Nation, 1776-1865” in The Bible in America, ed. Nathan O. Hatch, Mark A. Noll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 41-3.
Mark Noll, A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company), 83-243.
[9] John L. Brooke, The Refiner’s Fire: The Making of the Mormon Cosmology, 1644 – 1844 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[10] Nathan Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
Nathan Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

Tuesday, December 01, 2009

On Tragedy, Poetry and Justice


On Tragedy, Poetry and Justice

            In the late eight-century BCE, the Hebrew prophet Amos spoke on behalf of YHVH and instructed the people of Israel to, “Hate evil, love goodness and establish justice at all entrances. Perhaps then YHVH, the God of the hosts, will show favor to the remnant of Joseph.”[1] Upon opening the Hebrew Tanakh, one may turn to nearly any passage and find that this collection of holy texts is overwhelmingly concerned with mishpat, the performance of “justice.” Indeed, the word mishpat appears over 400 times in the Tanakh, compared with only nine times for the Greek analogs of krisis and dike in the New Testament.[2] In this respect, one may say that the Hebrew-Jewish tradition is one devoted to facilitating an establishment of justice on Earth, with the Laws of Moses forming the cornerstone. This decalogical approach to justice – the attempt to establish justice through the legally established ethical code of the Hebrew-speaking population of ancient Palestine – was not simply a contractual agreement among the people of Israel, but a literal covenant between Israel’s descendents and El, the Holy One.[3] This emphasis on an eternal law, imparted by an eternal and unchanging god, was the key difference between the Hebrew culture and those cultures that surrounded them in all directions. That is not to say, of course, that other contemporary cultures were not devoted to justice but, rather, that these cultures included understandings of justice that differed both in its source and its measuring. Though all cultural impressions of justice from the ancient world – the Hebrews included – contained elements that were constructed out of social necessity, there were also philosophers in Athens that understood a justice that was neither metaphysical, nor anthropological in nature.
            These men understood justice in the concept of dike: the dice-roll, a measure dispensed by physis.[4] This dikaiophysis cannot be acquired, controlled or even understood by humankind. [5] The observations of these Athenian philosophers led them to understand that physis – simply by being – moves, builds energy, stores it and releases it as needed. To impose a human morality or ethical judgment to the behavior of the kosmos is not only inappropriate, but also ultimately fruitless.[6] Without assigning a consciousness to it, they simply understood that physis will simply do as it requires regardless of the human life that may be affected by it. This necessary collection and dispersion of energy and matter is neither benevolent nor malevolent, nor is it ambivalent either: it simply is.
            Perhaps one of the best examples of this kind of thinking can be found in the tragoida of Sophocles, particularly the trilogy of Oedipus Tyrannus. In his Oedipal tragedy, one of the themes that Sophocles appears intent on establishing is a healthy skepticism of the new mathesis school of thought that would attempt to fit the raw deinos power of physis into a neat and orderly mathematical form.[7] This comes as a stern warning against the seductive belief that the anthropos can observe a formula that will tame physis and produce a more “just” environment for the flourishing of human civilization. He is also quick to show that mathesis is not the only tool that man would use to subvert nature, but that men like Oedipus would also use logos.[8] Sophocles would have us know that while the power of logos does enable humankind to transfer our understanding of physis to one another, it can also behave as the mechanism that allows physis to hide itself. It would not be inappropriate to suggest that the one apparatus that humankind can point to as our key to unlocking the mysteries of the Universe was produced for us by physis to veil our understanding of it. As Teiresias said, “Of themselves things will come, although I hide them and breathe no word of them.”[9] In the last play of his trilogy, Antigone, Sophocles warns the anthropos about any attempt to escape the inevitable tragoida nature of life on Earth.[10] The tragedy of Sophocles is about strife and conflict, though it is not necessarily malicious in nature. As a form of worship to Dionysus, his tragedies involve the internal confrontation of our contradictory impulses and these conflicts are as inevitable as they are irreconcilable. This, of course, is the “tragedy” of it. Crudely stated, life – as we understand it – isn’t going to “work out” for us and we most certainly will not get out alive. The tragoidos that Sophocles presents before his audience is intended not only to provide a kind of entertainment, but also to mitigate any expectations of imported metaphysical justice while embracing the Dionysian virtue of affirming life in any form it chooses to present itself. Moreover, the conflict of Antigone can be understood as mirroring the conflict that the human being wages in her own life: a conflict between the inescapable immanence of physis and the heavenly ideals of nomos.[11] As often as the dike of physis finds itself subject to the various interpretations of the anthropos, the ideals of nomos are on much flimsier footing and the inevitable contradictions in those ideals can quickly put two individuals at odds with one another. Not only does Antigone reveal the nature of these conflicts between human conventions and human justice when she says, “I shall be a criminal – but a religious one”, but Sophocles crafts her revelations carefully near line 555 when she concedes that her sister was “right in the eyes of one, and I in the other”.[12] Antigone’s defiant declarations expose this human belief in the metaphysical “trump card” when she tells Creon, “Yes, it was not Zeus that made the proclamation; nor did Justice, which lives with those below, that enacts such laws as that, for mankind. I did not believe your proclamation had such power to enable one who will someday die to override God’s ordinances, unwritten and secure”.[13] This dike of Sophocles, however, does not decide who is right or wrong in the matter of human affairs. One would even be warranted in suggesting that the justice of human affairs is not found in the quid pro quo reciprocity of the law, but in the natural tension that exists between two opposing or contradictory forces. Furthermore, this tension between two forces or two people – which cannot be grasped or made to settle into a firm mold – may be thought of as a pattern of ebb and flow in an unceasing exchange of energy. Indeed, any attempts to manipulate or circumvent this tension may leave us like Creon who – only after calamity has struck his family – admits to “the awful blindness of those plans of mine”, to which the chorus in Sophocles’ play answers, “I think you have learned justice – but only too late”.[14] In the final lines of Antigone, Sophocles’ Chorus leaves the audience with the sobering advice to, “Pray for no more at all. For what is destined for us, men mortal, there is no escape.” To the Athenian mind of Sophocles, physis will measure out to each of us what is just and no appeal to the nomos of metaphysis will help any of us escape it.[15]
            The careful reader may now be asking herself what she can make of this dikaiophysis in a world where the decalogical ethics of the Judeo-Christian tradition seems so inescapable. The uneasy tension between the modes of “justice” for Athens and Jerusalem is, perhaps, best seen in the poems of Paul Celan. As a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust, Celan not only embodies the victim of tragedy and injustice, but also exemplifies the classical tension between the Greco-European and the Hebrew-Oriental traditions. His poetry – influenced heavily by Greco-German philosophy, Jewish Messianic expectation and the ultimate tragedy of Ha-Shoah – confronts the aporia of these questions in a subtle, yet unapologetic fashion that brings his internal conflict and angst into full view.[16] Like many Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Celan was faced with what may be ultimately unanswerable questions about the inherent nature of humankind, the benevolence of divinity towards humankind, and what constitutes justice between men. In the Hebrew tradition, the Decalogical Law of Moses represents the formulaically ethical path to a concrete and metaphysically imported justice.
The five-line poem “In Rivers” touches this idea most directly where Celan writes, “In rivers north of the future / I cast the net you / haltingly weight / with stonewritten / shadows.” While there are certainly interpretations that are more faithful to Celan’s intent than others, his poems can be read in a number of different ways. I would offer a reading of this poem that draws on all three previously mentioned themes: Greco-German philosophy, Jewish Messianic expectation and Ha-Shoah.[17] As with Hölderlinian poetry, rivers can be understood both as vehicles for the passage of time, but also as thresholds: not only in a geographical sense, but also with regards to both the separation and gathering of life and death, the spheres of the mortal and the divine. These rivers “north of the future” not only establish a tense and chiastic relationship between chronos and kairos time in the poem, but also set up a foundation for the sense of longing that Celan intends to communicate.[18] At these rivers he casts the net, an allusion to the fisherman apostles of Christianity but also an exercise of faith in the face of hopelessness; not only in the sense of the apostles leaving their nets behind to follow Jesus, but it also refers to the two times that Jesus instructed his apostles to cast their nets and were greatly rewarded for their obedience and faith.[19] The nets, however, were “hesitantly burdened” (zögernd beshwerst) with “stonewritten shadows.” This line provides a unique window into Celan’s poetic genius, as the careful reader may be able to make out deliberate allusions not only to the Decalogue, but the teachings of Plato, Jesus and Nietzsche as well. Plato understood the best ideals of human life to be but “shadows” of the eternal light of the divine. As for the Christian imagery in this line, one might remember that Jesus calls his “net” or “yoke” a “light burden” that makes the schwergewicht of the “stonewritten” Law of Moses a mere shadow of itself.[20] Celan also seems to make use of this Platonic teaching only to turn it on its proverbial ear by showing how crushingly heavy even the shadow of that which is “stonewritten” in Judaism has proved to be on the Jewish people in history. Yet it is this schwergewicht that is precisely the kind of burden that – as Nietzsche claimed in his novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra – was ripe for the teeth of “the Lion”. In this way, Nietzsche seemed to argue that the burdens of metaphysical convention weigh down the human being and distance it from an appropriate relationship with physis, keeping her – as Heidegger might say – “homeless.” While this five-line poem does seem to convey a message of disillusionment with the Decalogue of Judaic religious and cultural tradition, it may go too far to suggest that Celan has no faith in the Hebrew tradition of justice that attempts to place the “the other” in an experiential relationship with “the self.”
Similarly, in the nine-line Jerusalem poem, “There Stood”, Celan notes the surroundings of he and his erotic companion, “There stood / a splinter of fig on your lip, / there stood / Jerusalem around us, / there stood / the bright pine scent / above the Danish skiff we thanked, / I stood / in you.” In the first three stanzas, Celan observes – an act that distances him from those objects. He is distanced from the lip of his companion, from the whole city of Jerusalem surrounding him, and even from the scents of pine. But his distance evaporates by the final stanza when he writes, “I stood in you.” Not only is there an erotic function of this rhetorical device – and it should not be ignored – but there is also a subtle philosophical worldview revealed here. One of the foundational principles of justice in the Judeo-Hebrew tradition instructs men to “practice love for the other, for you were once an other in a strange land.”[21] By standing in the “other”, Celan is affirming the ethical attempt to navigate, and close, that invisible distance between the “self” and the “other” while – as we saw earlier – not relying on decalogical metaphysics.[22] Indeed, while many in theological history may have treated his ethical teachings as “irrelevant” when compared to the dominant “atonement” theologies that sprouted up after his death, it seems that Jesus may have anticipated this non-decalogical Hebrew ethics in his own life.[23] The mere suggestion that one could simply collapse the hundreds and thousands of commandments in the Torah (and the accompanying Talmud) into a simple observation of loving “the other as you love your self”, was both scandalous and radical in the first century and, to some, it still is.[24]
Readers of Celan may also recognize this merging of self and other through the lens of dikaiophysis in the poem “I Drink Wine” as he writes, “I drink wine from two glasses / and plow away at / the king’s caesura / like that one / at Pindar, / God turns in his tuning fork / as one among the least / of the Just, / the lottery drum spills / our two bits.”[25] As with Celan’s other poems, these ten lines contain enough potential meanings to fill a dozen pages. One might make a successful reading of Celan claiming to “drink wine from two glasses” as a recognition of his dual heritage, both Jewish and German. The fact that he “[plows] away at the king’s caesura” may suggest not only that he recognizes no natural break between his German and Jewish heritage in the same way that Pindar recognized no natural break between poet and priest. Further on in the poem, Celan claims that “God turns in his tuning fork as one among the least of the Just” which, in my reading, shows God relinquishing this tuning fork – a metaphor for the skeptron of justice – that produces an initial tension and dissonance between two pitches and eventually fades into one authoritative pitch.[26] Not only does God relinquish this skeptron, but he does so “as one among the least of the Just” suggesting that the kind of justice that was produced by the Law is – in some way – insufficient or, perhaps, that God, himself, is the least of the Just. In the end, it appears that Celan has returned – in full Hölderlinian fashion – to the somber warning of the Sophoclean Chorus in Antigone when he concedes that, “aus der Lostrommel fällt / unser Deut” (“the lottery wheel spills our two parts”). The “lottery wheel”, in my reading, is to be understood as a modern analog to the “dice-roll” of dikaiophysis, measuring out what it finds necessary. Yet from this lottery wheel falls the two parts of Celan, Deutsche and Deuteronomy: German and Jew, oppressor and oppressed, murderer and victim.[27]
When attempting to navigate this suspended tension between two worlds – this Janusian threshold of justice that can neither be circumvented nor pierced – we may find only more contradictions, more conflict, and more tension than we expected or desired. How can we separate our tradition of ethics from the arbitrary lottery-wheel of physis and see justice outside of an anthropocentric mode of thinking?[28] What claims on justice can we hope to make in light of such an unspeakable tragedy as Ha-Shoah and who can hope to make them? Does that light forever cast “stonewritten shadows” on the schwergewicht of our human convention: our laws and our ethics? When even the most brilliant minds are unable to find a point of reconciliation between the Athenian dike and the Hebrew mishpat, the endeavor presents itself as hopelessly daunting to the rest of us. If we begin to recognize that the human being can never approach the event of justice, should that then discourage us from even trying? Do we punish those that violate the polis as Creon did, or do we leave this task to physis?[29] Would we even be satisfied with the kind of justice that physis, or the gods, provide? After all, as Jesus once said, “[God] causes the Sun to rise both on the righteous and the wicked, and makes the rain to fall on the just as well as the unjust.”[30] In the end, our yearning and hoping for justice may be – like logos and mathesis – simply a mechanism by which physis keeps the human being from transgressing the dangerous threshold that only our priests, prophets and poets may even hesitantly approach.


[1] Amos 5:15; YHVH is known as the Tetragrammaton, the four-letter name of the Hebrew god
[2] The Tanakh is the Hebrew Bible
[3] Decalogical is used here to reference the Ten Commandments as outlined in the Hebrew Torah
[4] Dike – Greek for “justice”; Physis, Greek for “that which comes of its own power” or, crudely, “nature”
[5] I use the word dikaiophysis to represent “the justice of the natural universe” or to approximate the meaning of “that form of justice which has no causal relationship to the efforts of human beings”
[6] Kosmos – Greek for “the earth” and “the heavens” or, simply, “the Universe”
[7] Mathesis – Greek root word for the English “mathematics”; Deinos, Greek for “that which is terrible and wonderful simultaneously”
[8] Logos – Greek for “word, language or idea”, represented here as the mechanism of communication between humans
[9] Greene, David, and Richard Lattimore. "Oedipus the King." Sophocles I - Second Edition. 1942. Reprint. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991. 9-76. Print, p. 24 : 341 (emphasis added).
[10] Tragoida – Greek for “goat song” and a form of worship for Dionysus, the god of both revelry and “tragedy”
[11] Nomos – Greek word approximating “all forms of human convention, including law, custom and cultural norms”
[12] Greene, David, and Richard Lattimore. "Antigone." Sophocles I - Second Edition. 1942. Reprint. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991. 9-76. Print, pp. 164 : 75, 183 : 555.
[13] Ibid. p. 178 : 450
[14] Ibid. p. 209 : 1265, 1270
[15] Metaphysis – Greek meaning “after or above physis”, used here to reflect the concept of the “supernatural”
[16] Ha-Shoah, meaning “great calamity” and the Hebrew analog to the Greek word holókauston (“holocaust”); aporia – Greek meaning “impassible”
[17] Celan, Paul. Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan. 1952. Reprint. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. Print, p. 227.
[18] I used the word “chiastic” to illustrate an “x”-shaped relationship between two contradictory forces; Kairos – Greek for festal time; Chronos – Greek for chronological time
[19] Matthew 4:20, Matthew 17:27, Luke 5:6
[20] Schwergewicht – German for “heavy weight” or “the heaviest of weights”
[21] Deuteronomy 10:19; Use of the word “other” in this passage is a revised translation of the Hebrew ger, meaning “alien, foreigner, outsider”
[22] I use the word “ethical” here, not in the original Greek sense of “habit” or “habitat”, but in the post-modern and popular sense of ethics as “a personal mode of conduct that governs interpersonal relations”
[23] Baldwin, George W. A Political Reading of the Life of Jesus. New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2006. Print.
[24] Matthew 19:18-19; Use of the word “other” in this passage is a revised translation from the Greek plesion, meaning both “friend” and “any other person”
[25] Celan, Paul. Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan. 1952. Reprint. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. Print, p. 367.
[26] Skeptron – Greek word meaning “stick, staff or scepter” as seen, perhaps, with both Oedipus and Moses
[27] Bold lettering superimposed in this sentence to emphasize the presence of the German word deut in Celan’s poem having the triple meaning of “bits” or “parts”, “German” and “Deuteronomy”
[28] I use the word “anthropocentric” to denote a worldview that places the human being as central in the world
[29] Polis – Greek for “city”
[30] Matthew 5:45; the words “just” and “unjust” are translated from the Greek dikaios and adikos, respectively

The Specter of Civil War


The Specter of Civil War


The end of World War II in 1945 was, and continues to be, a major line of demarcation in twentieth-century political studies for several important categories with, perhaps, none so important as that of intrastate conflict. In the decades since the end of World War II, geopolitical conflict has shifted dramatically away from major interstate conflicts in favor of an alarming upward trend of intrastate conflicts – also known as “civil wars.” As noted in the study by James Fearon and David Laitin, roughly 25 interstate conflicts – wars between two nations – have been waged between 1945 and 1999 with a death toll of approximately 3.33 million. In the same period there were 127 intrastate wars with more than 16.2 million dead; a ratio of roughly 5:1 in both the numbers of conflicts and loss of life. A related study found that the there is a considerable difference between the duration of interstate and intrastate wars, with the former lasting, on average, 480 days and the latter 1,665 days:  a ratio of 3.46:1. In short, civil wars have become the most deadly form of warfare on planet Earth since the end of World War II. Perhaps more daunting than the statistics associated with civil war is the simple fact that the causes of intrastate conflict are still not very well understood. Despite some genuine, well-funded and initially promising efforts to unlock the keys for forecasting and preventing civil wars, the “silver bullet” of forecasting and prevention remains elusive. The specter of civil war continues to haunt this planet, from the policy-makers in the most powerful halls of government to the simplest citizen trapped in a region of political instability.
In political science, there are generally three different approaches to understanding political conflict: a. the qualitative method of interviewing, aggregating and analyzing reports and predictions provided by subject matter experts (SMEs), b. the quantitative method of formulating robust statistical probability models that measure key factors (usually by proxy markers for larger political indicators) and, c. a combination of both. There are, to be sure, both advantages and disadvantages to each method with regard to political conflict in general and intrastate conflict in particular. The first method has the advantage of first-hand, experiential knowledge of a political hot spot. SMEs are paid to be “on the ground”, out and among the local population, reading the newspapers, keeping a close eye on potentially inflammatory situations. They provide a potentially critical human intelligence factor to information gathering. The major disadvantages to relying primarily on SMEs are that they, of course, cannot be everywhere at once. Their perspective, while usually trained to be heightened, is still in the limited first person. S/he must act as their own filter of information and, as such, the reliability of providing pertinent information to the proper individuals is understandably hampered. There is also, of course, the cost associated with keeping these people on the payroll and the hidden cost of keeping them hidden in plain sight. Moreover, the motivation of money can be potentially double-edged as a SME can be under a lot of pressure to provide useful information in exchange for payment, thus providing less-than-reliable information or, worse, be paid to provide false information to authorities and agencies. Moreover, the potential payoff may be very limited. As Phil Tetlock notes in his book, Expert Political Judgment, the discrimination and calibration scores of SMEs – or “Hedgehogs” as he refers to them – are barely higher than the average scores of a UC Berkley political science undergraduate.[1]
All of these factors led many countries, like the United States, to develop quantitative methods for capturing and analyzing data in hopes of predicting in a more accurate and cost-effective way than using SMEs. These methods usually come in the form of highly sophisticated statistical probability matrices developed by mathematicians and computer programmers. It would be unfortunate to revert to the extreme of a stereotype in order to prove a point, but it should be painfully obvious what limitations mathematicians and computer programmers may have in the political sciences. There should be no doubt that the quality of a model is not only determined by the quality of the code language it is written in but, more importantly, its quality is determined by the “statistical significance” associated with each variable as well as the information fed into the model itself. “Garbage in, garbage out,” as the old saying goes. And, as with many contrasting methods, the best answer probably lays somewhere in combining the two: striking the “perfect” balance that maximizes the advantages of both while, simultaneously minimizes the disadvantages. This is, as you may suspect, not nearly as easy at it sounds. Finding the researcher that has equally elite parts of mathematical brilliance and geopolitical knowledge who is also willing to tackle what, so far, appears to be as impossible elusive as intrastate conflict is, in many respects, very similar to drafting an NFL Hall of Fame quarterback. The statistical odds of success decrease dramatically as one attempts to find enough of these individuals to fill an entire research group. What few research groups and studies that currently exist in this field are complicated by an understandable, yet highly counter-productive, competitive antagonism between those in the quantitative and qualitative methodological camps. Factoring in personality differences, competition in academic pedigree and prevailing ideological worldviews, the apparent hopelessness of the task at hand becomes nearly overwhelming. Yet in the midst of such impressive obstacles, several groups have emerged with promising studies. The papers and studies I will be discussing are: “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War” by Ibrahim Elbadawi of the World Bank and Nicholas Sambanis of Yale University, “Greed and grievance in civil war” by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler from Oxford University, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” by James Fearon and David Laitin from Stanford University, “When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars” by Patrick Brandt from The University of Texas at Dallas, T. David Mason from The University of North Texas, Mehmet Gurses from Florida Atlantic University, Nicolai Petrovsky from Cardiff University and Dagmar Radin from Mississippi State University and, finally, “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts” by Michael Ward and Brian D. Greenhill from the University of Washington with Kristin Bakke from Leiden University.
Each of these essays contributes – in varying degrees – to the third, combined method I discussed earlier in the introduction. I say that they contribute “in varying degrees” mostly because all of them fall much harder on the quantitative side of the question than the qualitative. Moreover, each study is one that centers on the whole of civil wars rather than a particular “hot spot” or theatre of conflict, as one would come to expect from a report filed by an SME. The qualitative contributions of each study come mostly from each group’s interpretation of the data and the policy recommendations that accompany it. With that being said, each paper is devised with the underlying premise that quantitative modeling is a crucial element to understanding political conflict, an opinion that must be noted up front, since political scientists across the globe do not universally share it. With this essay, I hope to present and analyze both the groundbreaking contributions as well as the problems of each study, in conjunction with a recommendation for the direction of further studies into the causes and, ultimately, the prevention of intrastate wars.
Before I discuss the findings specific to each study, it might be helpful to go over the obstacles that present themselves in any attempt to compare or contrast these studies. The first obstacle is that each study is, at least in some ways, built on the back of the research, findings and recommendations that came before it. Like most of the applied mathematical sciences, these projects and studies are never done in a vacuum. Every researcher brings a lifetime of accrued knowledge and imports, for good or bad, the history of conflict into the projections. Moreover, when dealing with projects of this kind it becomes quickly apparent that there is a definite chasm of opinion between the groups. That is to say that each paper is delivered from a different literal and metaphorical page as the paper before it. As the reader will see early in the comparison, there are deep-seated divisions between the groups not only on methods and models, but on foundational worldviews that speak to each researcher’s own theory on the function of the government and, in some studies, of what it means to be human. Since this is a paper neither on political theory nor on foundational ontological philosophy, I hope to present these interpretations only in a limited sense as they pertain to the studies themselves. The second obstacle, and perhaps the hardest one to address, comes in the same vein as the previous one: none of these research groups uses the same data sets as the others. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler’s data on civil war is from 1960 to 1999 and analyzes only 79 civil conflicts. Fearon and Laitin’s research is from 1945 to 1999 and analyzes 127 civil wars, an increase of 28% in the number of years and 38% in the number of cases over Collier and Hoeffler. Brandt et al’s data is from 1945 to 1997 and the number of civil wars is 108, slightly smaller than Fearon and Laitin but much larger than Collier and Hoeffler. The paper delivered by Elbawadi and Sambanis does not provide specific data sets but appears to use a similar data set to Brandt. Finally, the critical analysis provided in the Ward, Greenhill and Bakke paper discusses the data and findings of both Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin, but uses a third model to analyze the effectiveness of the first two models as if they were studies done on equal terms, which they are not.
In conjunction with a lack of consistency in the data sets used between studies, there is also – though less surprising – a lack of consistency in the models that are used. No two groups rely on the same model to analyze the data. Each of these papers not only presents their own set of data, but a whole new proprietary model with which to analyze it. As one might expect, the statistical likelihood of two research groups providing similar results or recommendations when different data and models are used is “zero”. The meaningful quality of these papers is immediately hampered by the lack of consistency in the data sets and the models. This, of course, is not to say that they cannot be useful on their own terms, or even compared between them, but it is important for any researcher to keep this in mind when addressing these papers critically. Another common problem with each study is that they all begin with the presumption that major factors for political stability (or instability) can be understood by substituting “proxy” indicators. Specific examples of these will be discussed later in the paper, but it is of the utmost importance to understand that each of these models was developed: a. with the assumption-driven hypotheses of the researchers in mind, b. under the assumption that the factors that contribute to in/stability actually do and, c. that the proxies set up for each factor are both generally accurate, as well as appropriate with respect to the proportional significance of the factor. Simply put, these models are founded on the assumptions of the researchers and the empirical measurements set up to test these assumptions may be pointed in the “wrong” direction. Perhaps more dangerously than the charge that these models produced inaccurate findings is the overarching charge that the models themselves are designed to produce findings that only confirm the initial hypotheses. Again, crudely stated, the potential output of any model is inherently limited by those predetermined and hypothetical factors on which the model is based. In other words, each of these research groups must be able to demonstrate – and, to-date, has not demonstrated – that the model was designed to produce only those results which the researchers wanted it to. While I do not intend to charge any of these groups with outright falsification – nor would I agree with anyone that levies that charge without indisputable proof – the phantom of impropriety must be resolutely dispelled in any quantitative analysis before the veracity of its results can be relied upon for policy decisions that affect the lives of millions. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will address each study on its own terms without an undermining suspicion of its authenticity. It should be noted that while there is an obvious chronology to each of the papers I will discuss, I will not be discussing them in chronological order. Some of the papers have gone through several revisions from their earliest forms and I do not intend to present a historiography of the research but rather a qualitative analysis of it. In this respect, I hope to show that chronology is not as material as content.
Ibrahim Elbawadi and Nicholas Sambanis’ paper “How Much War Will We See?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War”, appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2002. While this paper is dated as the earliest delivered out of the five discussed in this essay, the date of this paper is not simply to establish chronology but context, the reason for which will be explained later. In this paper, Elbawadi and Sambanis do not provide sample information for their analysis but they do mention that they are looking at 108 civil wars. While their paper was released five years before the Brandt study, it appears likely that Elbawadi and Sambanis used a similar or the same data set that the Brandt paper used in 2007.[2] As mentioned before, each of these papers have gone through a number of different versions and updates, including this study and the papers of other scholars that are sourced in this essay, such as Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin. What is interesting about the date of publication for this particular article is that it comes on the heels of al Qaeda’s attacks on New York, Washington and Shanksville on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent involvement of U.S. and N.A.T.O. forces in the Afghan Civil War between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. While I will address the significance of the timing later in this section, I believe that the recommendations that Elbawadi and Sambanis make are not done in a vacuum.
According to the introduction of the project, Elbawadi and Sambanis set out to highlight – in their opinion – a major flaw in overestimating the economic impact on civil war prevalence at the expense of studying ethno-religious fractionalization.[3] The study operates on three fundamental hypotheses: a. An increase in economic opportunity within a state will decrease the prevalence of civil war, b. An increase in democratic polity ratings within a state will decrease the prevalence of civil war and, c. The closer that ethnic fragmentation approaches a middle amount, the higher the increase of civil war prevalence will manifest.[4] In their study, they explore the hypothesis that all rebellions are beholden to the amount of financing they can secure; therefore natural resources and the availability of finances is the largest contributor to civil wars.[5] They claim that despite “rising averages in world income and democracy levels” the world is “less safe [now] than 40 years ago”.[6] What is important about this particular admission is that it appears to go counter to their claim that the quality of democratic polity ratings are central to the prevalence of civil wars? It appears as though the closer the ethnic diversity ratio between two groups within a state approaches 50% apiece, the higher the risk of civil war manifests, especially in conjunction with a high national population. While the significance of ethnic fragmentation seems to be the heaviest statistical factor weighed by this study, it is not the only factor discussed. In analyzing the polity rating for states with previous civil war data, the study suggests that a low democratic polity rating also implies that the population of the state has a significant lack of options whereby they may peacefully articulate grievances. [7]
This political reality, according to the study, is tantamount to inevitable military conflict. It is from this logic-inspired deduction that Elbawadi and Sambanis arrive at the pre-eminence of democratic regimes in preventing political conflict, admittedly in spite of this particular factor having been dismissed by a number of previous – and subsequent – studies.[8] It is interesting that when the results of the model do not ultimately prove out against their initial hypotheses (or support their subsequent conclusions and recommendations), they argue that the factors in their models that don’t appear to be statistically significant may be so interdependent on factors that are statistically significant that the insignificant variables are, themselves, significant.[9] A confusing and potentially counter-productive argument, to be sure, and especially even more so considering they do little in the way of clarifying or adjusting for this claim in their own research. In the end, it appears that Elbawadi and Sambanis were convinced from the beginning that certain factors were undeniably involved in political in/stability and ignored the lack of evidence in their own research to arrive, in circular fashion, no further than where they began. While I don’t call into question the sincerity of their convictions, I do believe that their conclusions were too strongly influenced by the political climate of the U.S. and Europe in late 2001 and early 2002 to provide anything of lasting utility to the question of political and intrastate conflict. Indeed, their recommendations on this question represent the politically “safe” position that would ultimately form the foundation of the so-called “Bush doctrine” of foreign policy: a. it is important to improve the number and quality of democratic regimes in the world, b. it is important to improve the economic opportunity and growth of impoverished nations, by way of increasing a nation’s per capita income, and c. that improving the political conditions for a state is more feasible than attempting to develop advanced and high-yield economic infrastructure in a repressive regime with a low polity ranking.[10] The essence of their policy recommendation is that, despite any statistical correlations between a high polity ranking and lack of intrastate conflict, policy-makers should engage in what amounts to the age-old practice of “nation building” in order to decrease the overall risk of civil war. Of course, the two primary efforts of the United States to increase economic and democratic values within troubled regions of the world – Afghanistan and Iraq – are still ongoing and, currently, without any substantial exit strategy. More than preventing a civil war in either country, the U.S. appears to have created or prolonged two of them by following this recommendation.
The next study I wish to discuss came from the Oxford Economic Papers is an article entitled “Greed and grievance in civil war” by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler from Oxford University in 2004. The work by Collier and Hoeffler is, without a doubt, mentioned most often by the other sources in this essay and it appears that the work established by these two scholars is highly respected, even if those citing them disagree with their findings. In the paper published in 2004, Collier and Hoeffler attempt to offer an “econometric” model of predicting civil war, relying on a blend of “motive and opportunity” believing that rebellion, like murder, requires both.[11] Collier and Hoeffler use a data set that includes civil wars only from 1960-1999. This time period includes 13-15 less years than contemporary models, which constitute 25-28% decrease in sample size over other the other four studies in this essay. Similarly, they only analyze 79 civil wars, as opposed to 108 civil wars from Brandt et al and 127 from F&L, which constitutes a 27-38% smaller sample than other contemporary studies.[12] They also do a particularly good job of summarizing the ongoing debate between political scientists and economists on the question of intrastate conflict, claiming that political theorists have long argued that civil wars happen due to grievances, while economists have begun to theorize that the causes for civil wars are more akin to new industry that uses political violence as a means to collect resources.[13]
As would be the case in Elbawadi and Sambanis’ argument, Collier and Hoeffler argue that grievance may not be the best explanatory factor for rebellion since all countries have social groups that have grievances against the predominant regime.[14] Instead, they want to analyze “quantitative indicators of opportunities”, including primary commodity export dependence, rebel financing from foreign diasporas, and rebel financing from hostile governments.[15] As I alluded to before, some of the factors and proxied indicators can potentially leave policy-makers dissatisfied. These are certainly included in that risky group. Their proxy for the measurement of a diaspora’s effective range of influence on the country of origin is the number of immigrants from that country currently living in the United State as provided by U.S. census data.[16] I wonder if this really the best data to use? What about diasporas living in Europe and industrialized countries in East Asia such as China, Japan and Korea? It appears that this proxy could be accused of myopia and a narrow scope. Moreover it appears to betray a belief that international citizens find the United States the most attractive place to live and the U.S. census provides an accurate picture of non-American diasporic communities. Again, I question using data from the Cold War as a proxy for financing from hostile governments in a post-Cold War environment.[17] While the data is certainly analogous, the motivation and the amount since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. can only certainly be different. Yet even if they remain constant after 1990, Collier and Hoeffler do nothing to reinforce the accuracy of this proxy or assuage any doubt against potential concerns.
While many of the opportunity factors listed are eventually whittled down to measure their statistical significance within a combined model, the final factors that remain in the model are: economic dependence on a primary commodity export, funding for the insurgency provided by foreign diasporas and/or foreign governments, per capita income, male secondary schooling, economic growth rate, and population demographics.[18] The most statistically significant factor of the group is, by far, state dependence on primary commodity exports. According to the published study by Collier and Hoeffler, the “risk of conflict peaks when [primary commodity exports] constitute 33% of GDP”, thus, “primary exports are highly significant.” At “peak danger” of 33% of GDP there is a 22% chance of civil war, compared to 1% for countries with no primary commodity dependence.[19]
In the end, Collier and Hoeffler appear to end their recommendation on a peace keeping note, urging policy-makers to help maintain peace in those countries that have seen intrastate conflict, since – as they interpret the final factor – by way of a cliché: “time heals.” In other words, the longer the duration since the last intrastate conflict the more chance a state has to recuperate and reinforce those positive forces that discourage civil conflict.[20] While running the risk of oversimplifying each series of policy recommendations to dominant ideological worldviews, it would not be inappropriate to suggest that these recommendations are strongly pro-U.N. and pro-N.A.T.O. The underlying suggestion here is that international organizations and governmental coalitions should engage actively in peacekeeping operations in troubled regions of the world in order to reinforce “peace episodes”, thus reducing the likelihood of resurgence in rebellion. It would also not be inappropriate to tie this opinion and the timing of this paper’s release to a growing international criticism of the foreign policies of the Bush administration in the Afghan theatre and freshly started Iraq war.
In their 2003 paper from the American Political Science Review, James Fearon and David Laitin took up the question of what extent ethno-religious fractionalization plays in the development of intrastate conflict. Inspired in part by the ethno-religious conflict in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the Arab-Persian wars of the 1980s, the ethnic violence in the Balkans and eastern Europe and the continued ethnic violence in Africa, there has been a significant scholarly opinion that the high prevalence of conflict and civil war since 1945 owes much to long-standing ethnic and religious fractionalization in under-developed nations. Fearon and Laitin disagree with this assumption and set out in this paper to test it against a model that they developed to measure “conditions that favor insurgency”.[21] According to the model developed by Fearon and Laitin, the problem of civil violence cannot be attributed simply to democracy, religion or ethnic composition. Instead, the seemingly elusive reasons for civil war arise from a deeply complex and integrated set of conditions that contributes, according to their theory, to political instability and civil violence of all kinds. In short, regardless of ethno-religious diversity or antagonism within a state, the higher the per-capita income, the less risk there is within that state for insurgency. It seems that, in the view of Fearon and Laitin, the old colloquial adage that you can simply rub the money “wherever it hurts” holds true. Moreover, Fearon and Laitin are not particularly convinced that those factions that identify themselves as “ethnic” or “nationalist” have any substantial difference from any other form of insurgency.[22] It would be misleading, however, to classify Fearon and Laitin’s views of ethnic diversity as wholly insignificant as they do argue that ethnic diversity can indirectly lead to conditions which provide prime ground for insurgency, even if they don’t influence the insurgency directly.[23] This position on regime type and ethnic fragmentation, then, is a noteworthy shift away from the belief that grievances are the main motivations for intrastate conflict, rather than opportunity. Their model for insurgency is based almost entirely on the premise that wherever there are opportunities for (i.e. a sufficient number of factors favoring) insurgency, regardless of the motivation, an insurgency will emerge to challenge the government. These factors include, but are not limited to: a newly independent state, a politically unstable central government, a substantial national population, a separate territorial base from the central seat of government (such as East Pakistan/Bangladesh), the willingness of foreign governments or diasporas to provide funding and/or weapons to insurgents, the presence of low-weight, high-value natural resources for exploitative use by insurgents to fund activity, and/or the presence of oil.
The foundational premise for using per capita income as a proxy for government strength comes is based on the notion that the lower a nation’s GDP is, the less money there is for the government to tax/appropriate for public services, police and infrastructure. Tellingly, the Fearon-Laitin model shows that a decrease of $1,000 in GDP can result in an increase of 41% in the chance for civil war. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin argue that weakened economic conditions (including low per capita income) make recruiting easier for insurgent factions.[24] Nearing the conclusion of their study, Fearon and Laitin suggest that these states with low economic production should be classified as their own kind of regime type (regardless of polity rankings) known as “anocracies”, a government whose central authority is either weak or non-existent. These anocracies, because of a lack of government revenue by way of economic production, do not have the resources – outside of foreign aid – to stamp out the insurgency.[25] The only obvious exception to this hypothesis are those states with extensive oil reserves providing the central government with sufficient “easy” money without the need to develop a strong social infrastructure, leaving dispersed populations, in theory, isolated enough to develop an insurgency without the watchful eye of the government.[26]
All of these findings are wholly contingent on the accuracy of the proxies they assign for each factor and – as one might expect – the proxies are certainly not bulletproof. The counter-insurgency power of a central government is proxied by the state’s estimated GDP. The most obvious problem is that these numbers, while generally reliable, are still estimates. For the countries found most often under the lens of research, official records and data collection is very difficult. Most of the research is done in highly industrialized Western countries where – as Fearon and Laitin put it – “socially intrusive” infrastructure and bureaucracies reach far and deep. Researchers will quickly find, however, that the availability of reliable records in under-developed countries like Afghanistan or Zimbabwe are slim-to-none. A wholly acceptable criticism would be that if an “anocracy” doesn’t have the resources to provide police or military defense forces enough to protect its citizens or interests, then why should they be expected to keep accurate records on national finances? Moreover, this proxy assumes that the funds that make up GDP are available for state collection or that the state has a mechanism in place to collect taxes and fees. Afghan farmers that produce poppies for opiates are generating revenue, but does that revenue always translate to tax revenue for the state? Considering these factors, it seems that GDP as a proxy for the strength of a state is probably not as accurate as Fearon and Laitin would like it to be for the purposed of their model. Coming to this initial conclusion is important since Fearon and Laitin’s model is almost entirely predicated on this one “statistically significant” variable. This is not to say that the predictive power - as the Ward, Greenhill and Bakke study addresses – is completely lost, but it is important for researchers in this field to understand how thin the ice on which they stand is. As I crudely put it earlier in this essay, “garbage in, garbage out.” With that being said, the suggestion that “anocratic” states are most susceptible to insurgencies seems to be on sure footing as the incidence of countries with a strong central government that faced insurgent forces and rebellions have been very few in history, especially since 1945. Where Fearon and Laitin’s anocratic governments seem to be most vulnerable does not seem to be as dependent on GDP as it does on the age of the state and the time with which it was given during “peace periods” to develop “socially intrusive” infrastructure and bureaucracies. States/governments that are younger than two years are 5.25 times more likely to have a civil war than others.[27] This is best seen, perhaps, with the formation of the UN and the disintegration of most European colonial systems at the end of WWII.[28] In addition, those countries that contain at least 50% mountainous terrain have twice as much of a chance to experience a civil war (from 6.5% to 13.2%) as similar countries.[29] The terrain itself provides little explanation aside from being a proxy for the difficulty and expense involved in the government’s attempts to expand infrastructure outside of major population zones. If a government is unable to penetrate the hostile topography within its own borders, it is unlikely that this country will: a. be able to develop those lands effectively for economic exploitation and, b. patrol those lands in counter-insurgency and police operations.
The conclusions of this study, such as it is, do appear to be reasonable ones, even if the questions and concerns with their model go unresolved. They find that in history that it was decolonization in the aftermath of WWII and the early decades of the UN that created poor and weak states. These “anocracies” were susceptible to all kinds of insurgencies, regardless of the motivation for that insurgency. As such, to focus on ethno-religious fractionalization or polity ratings for a given state is a mistake. Rather, the spread of democracy and policies that reflect ethno-religious tolerance should be encouraged because they are generally good for people, not because they are believed to be “magic bullets” for ending or preventing civil wars.[30] The recommendation of the Fearon-Laitin study is: in order to decrease the statistical likelihood of civil war within a country, the central governments in high-risk scenarios must be strengthened, well funded and aided in the development of a socially “intrusive” bureaucracy.[31] In the end, countries that have proven incapable of successful self-government should be candidates for UN “neotrusteeship”.[32]
The study done by Brandt, Mason, Gurses, Petrovsky and Radin takes the question of civil wars in a slightly different direction, hoping to show that understanding how civil wars end can be as significant as how they begin.[33] In the paper published for Defence and Peace Economics in 2008, “When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars”, Brandt et al. establishes that, without question, civil wars are not only the costliest form of war since 1945 in terms of casualties but also the most disruptive in terms of time spent on violent conflict. The first thing Brandt et al. does is establish firmly that the data they are using for their model comes from the Correlates of War (COW). This is important for purposes of transparency, which – according to the footnotes from the first page of their introduction – appears to be important to this ongoing research question. They both acknowledge the many suggested revisions from readers and editors as well as accept responsibility for any remaining errors in the research, model and/or published material. According to the data in the COW, they found that civil wars have caused almost four times the amount of deaths as interstate wars since 1945 and have lasted almost four times as long on average. They record 23 interstate wars between 1945-1997 with a casualty total of 3.3 million and an average duration of 480 days. The only data point in this study where interstate fighting seems to be higher than its civil war counterpart is in the total average deaths per conflict series, with interstate at approximately 143,000 per incident. Intrastate conflict, on the other hand, was seen in 108 different episodes, saw 11.8 casualties and lasted on average 1,665 days. The average casualty rate for a civil war topped out at approximated 105,000. All of these statistics point, unquestionably, to the overwhelming deadliness of civil wars since 1945. Correspondingly, any efforts or success in shortening the duration of civil wars will significantly decrease both the overall conflict occurring at any given point in time, but will also decrease the political, collateral and life losses that accompany those conflicts.[34]
These statistical points direct Brandt et al. to the suggestion that it is just as important to analyze how – and when – civil wars end as it is to analyze other factors about them, since when they end usually has a significant impact on how they end.[35] Setting up a cross-section of possibilities, Brandt’s team argues that the four potential resolutions are: a. the rebels quit fighting and the government crushes the insurgency, b. the government quits fighting and the rebellion takes control of the disputed facilities and infrastructure, c. both parties choose to quit fighting and the conflict ends in a negotiated settlement or, d. neither party quits and the fighting continues.[36] The rest of their argument is predicated on the assumption that negotiations are always less preferable to combatants than total victory, not in the least part because negotiated settlements usually take the longest to reach, thus draining both sides of precious resources, population (i.e. military manpower and economic production) and continue to raise the risk to necessary infrastructure.[37] Beginning with these assumptions, the team devises a number of hypotheses to test for the purposes of measuring the correlation between the duration of a war and its outcome. These hypotheses contribute, in part, to how the model produces conclusions, but it seems not nearly so much as the previously examined models. In any event, the model provides the following rules for civil war duration: a. The larger the casualty rate, the shorter the war will be as the existing pool of resources will be depleted quicker, b. the larger the government forces, the shorter the war will be, c. the involvement of external financial and military forces will increase the duration of the conflict regardless of which side the support is given to, d. the percentage of mountainous terrain positively affects the duration of conflict and e. civil wars of secession last longer than civil wars of revolution. The last point is the first and only mention among all of the analyzed models that takes into consideration the difference between an insurgency of secession and an insurgency of revolution which is surprising considering the “end goal” of the insurgency is a primary factor for understanding how the begin in the first place. The motivations, regardless of “greed” or “grievance”, are very different for each kind of rebellion, especially when one considers that some of the factors in previous models have dealt with questions of ethno-religious fractionalization, democratic polity, access to wealth and “socially intrusive” infrastructure. As such, it is highly significant that the Brandt study revealed that secessionists appear to be much more determined and patient than revolutionaries with regard to extended conflict.
As such, the following conclusions are draw from the Brandt data: a. in the first five years of a conflict, government and rebel victories are equally as likely, b. from five to seven years government victory is the most likely and, c. from seven years onward the most likely outcome is a negotiated settlement. The most obvious fact provided by these conclusions is that a rebel force is never given the best odds of victory. At no point in the “under seven years” time-scale of a civil war are rebel forces given a high likelihood of victory against the government. Indeed, their best chances are in the first five years and, comparatively speaking, this is not a particularly large window of time with which to recruit, engage and overthrow even a generally weak government. The policy recommendation that this paper relies on is that our attitudes should never reflect a belief that civil wars simply “burn themselves out” or that we should just “give war a chance”. What should be noted is that there is a potentially unspoken recommendation from this paper, one that policy makers are sure to “read between the lines”: in order to keep civil wars short (decreasing casualties and keeping destruction of infrastructure to a minimum), external governments should do what is necessary to bolster countries that are in danger of developing an insurgency to ensure that government forces in those countries are overwhelmingly stronger than any potential opposition and that the infrastructure necessary to create a “socially intrusive” infrastructure is available for those countries in the form of foreign aid. This underlying recommendation, intentional or not, flies directly in the face of Brandt et al.’s secondary expressed recommendation that external involvement in the war only serves to increase its duration.
The final paper I wish to discuss is the one study I can find the least fault with as it was designed to be a critical study of Fearon and Latin and Collier and Hoeffler’s models. The study, titled “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts” is slated for publication in the Journal of Peace Research and was written by Michael Ward, Brian Greenhill and Kristin Bakke.[38] This aptly titled study focuses on the problems that arise from relying on models that “postdict” statistical significance at the expense of producing out-of-sample predictions.[39] Ward’s group argues that without interpretation, statistical summaries can easily be oversimplified and definitely misleading, and that the true value of a model is based solely on how well it makes predictions.[40]
Turning to the papers published by Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler, they surmise that those statistically significant factors of existing models produce interesting results aren’t worth much if the predicting power of the model does not translate to out-of-sample conflicts.[41] By making an argument about out-of-sample conflicts, Ward et al. bring to the forefront an issue that has not been addressed by any of the previous models, including Brandt’s work: that all of these models’ “statistically significant” factors – along with the highly-rated success of these models’ indicators – are based on a compilation of all of the existing data that went into the model. If, as Ward et al. suggest, a case that does not belong to the existing data group, the model’s ability to predict is cut significantly. Arguing that the models of Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler suffer from research design flaws, Ward’s group demonstrates that both models – when asked to predict at high error tolerance thresholds – produce more “false positives” than real ones and – when asked to predict at low error tolerance thresholds – produce no real positives at all, suggesting that the discrimination power of the models are abysmally low.[42]
The key, according to Ward et al., to refining the models is the incorporation of out-of-sample counterfactual data in order to keep the models from “overfitting” and improve both discrimination and calibration.[43] While Ward’s group only intended to discuss the problems of design flaws for the model in-depth, they also conclude that there is room for other researchers to look to improve upon the problems of mis-specification with both models – particularly with regard to incorporating the diffusive effects of regional stability patterns, as well as lowering the level of data aggregation to a more localized level instead of treating all nations as though they adhere to the, mostly, arbitrarily set political boundaries of post-WWII decolonization.[44] In that respect, they are pointing to the importance of not only looking at national levels, but at more localized data, trends and patterns as reflecting conflict epicenters that spread outward rather than everywhere in a country at once.[45] This appears to be a very appropriate recommendation, especially when one considers that the violence between narco-cartels in northern Mexico and federal police agencies have resulted in more casualties than all of the official U.S. casualties in Iraq. Mexican officials have been assassinated, “insurgent” forces from the cartels have directly engaged military personnel from both Mexico and the U.S., and – at least rhetorically – the Mexican government has declared a “war” against these very dangerous organizations. Despite the technical criteria that produce conflict classification – and the vocal objections of the Mexican government – to the contrary, the situation just south of the United States’ border with Mexico shares a number of the most dangerous similarities with previous and current intrastate conflicts. As became obvious in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., many of the classifications of conflicts and combatants need to be updated in order to adequately assess a changing field. 
            What can be seen from a brief comparison of these various studies, scholarly criticism can often appear to be sharp and unforgiving. With years’ worth of work and reputation balanced against the potential accolades of developing the next great leap in political theory, political theorists can become unintentionally rigid in their methods and conclusions. Despite the myriad temptations to lose sight of this goal, the eye must remain fixed, the mind open and the will determined in order to meet the challenge laid at one’s feet by generations of failed attempts. The projects, papers and studies represented in this essay represent the furthest step toward a goal of protecting and cultivating peace. As far as these efforts have brought the study of political conflict, further steps are necessary. Further refinement of the models – from assumption to design, data to specifications, conclusions to recommendations – is still necessary. I concur with Ward’s group that the incorporation of regional influence must be taken into consideration and that conflict zones must be understood in a more local, epicentral way rather than relying on potentially misleading national aggregates. I also agree with Ward et al. that “statistically significant” is ultimately insignificant if the model cannot produce accurate predictions for out-of-sample or counterfactual cases. While the choice of proxy indicators for major factors are limited, and the data to feed those proxies is even more so, researchers must do better than use rough estimates and pre-Cold War figures to proxy twenty-first century factors. Perhaps most important of all is that they must work harder to keep foundational assumptions about how the world works from influencing the models they build. Another potentially helpful method would be to work less with those that they see eye-to-eye with and more with those that represent opposite, and even hostile, worldviews in order to achieve a broader vision of conflict inauguration and conflict resolution. As we have come to expect, technology is a powerful assistant to these efforts, but it cannot overcome all of the obstacles on its own: it is important to retain and reinforce human involvement where necessary, bolstering the apparatus of SME-dom with the most sophisticated probability forecasting models. Ultimately, however, it seems that the possibilities of these accomplishments are capped only by human imagination and the resolve to put that imagination to work.


[1] Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?, p. 77
[2] Elbawadi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. “How Much War Will We See?: Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 307-334. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “ES” in footnotes.
[3] ES, 308
[4] ES, 311
[5] ES, 309
[6] ES, 317
[7] ES, 310
[8] ES, 325
[9] ES, 326
[10] ES, 331
[11] Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563-595. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “CH” in footnotes.) CH, 563.
[12] CH, 565
[13] CH, 564
[14] CH, 564
[15] CH, 565, 568
[16] CH, 568
[17] CH, 568
[18] CH, 567-570
[19] CH, 565, 574 and 580
[20] CH, 589
[21] Fearon, James, and David Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97.1 (2003): 75-90. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “FL” in footnotes.) FL, 75.
[22] FL, 79
[23] FL, 83
[24] FL, 79, 80 and 83
[25] FL, 85
[26] FL, 81
[27] FL, 85
[28] FL, 87
[29] FL, 85
[30] FL, 88
[31] FL, 88
[32] FL, 89
[33] Brandt, Mason, Gurses, Petrovsky and Radin will be referred to as “Brandt”, “Brandt’s group” or “Brandt et al.” henceforth in the body of the text.
[34] Brandt, Patrick, T. Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicholai Petrovsky, Dagmar Radin. “When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars.” Defence and Peace Economics 19.6 (2008): 415-434. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “Brandt” in footnotes.) Brandt, 416
[35] Brandt, 417
[36] Brandt, 418
[37] Brandt, 418, 419
[38] Ward, Greenhill and Bakke will be referred to either as “Ward’s group” or “Ward et al.” henceforth in the body of the text.
[39] Ward, Michael D., Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin Bakke. "The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts." Proc. of 50th Annual Convention of International Studies Association, New York. 2009. Print. (Henceforth referred to as “Ward” in footnotes.) Ward, 2, FL, 76
[40] Ward, 3-4
[41] Ward, 4
[42] Ward, 7-8
[43] Ward, 14
[44] Ward, 18
[45] Ward, 19